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Outward Foreign Direct Investment from BRIC 
countries: 
Comparing strategies of Brazilian, Russian, Indian 
and Chinese multinational companies 
Wladimir Andreff1 
Abstract 
An overall comparative study of outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) from BRIC countries and 
strategies conducted by multinational companies (MNCs) based in the BRICs is elaborated on with a 
same methodology for Brazil, Russia, India and China. The comparison pertains to the historical 
emergence of firms’ internationalisation, their booming expansion in the 2000s then their muddling 
through the current crisis, the specificities of OFDI from each home country, OFDI geographical 
distribution and industrial structure, econometric testing of the respective determinants of Brazilian, 
Russian, Indian and Chinese OFDI, and the role of home countries’ governments vis-à-vis home-
based MNCs. Beyond some common characteristics, BRICs’ MNCs exhibit a number of major 
country-specific features. 
JEL: F21, F23, O57, P52 
Keywords: foreign direct investment, multinational companies, emerging countries, BRICs, 
comparative economic studies 
Outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) from post-communist and fast-
growing developing (emerging) countries started to increasingly draw attention in the 
early 2000s2. Since then, analysing foreign investment strategies of multinational 
companies (MNCs) whose parent headquarters are based in each BRIC country has 
actually become a fashioned avenue for research. The literature based on country case 
studies has been growing at a skyrocketing pace during the past decade, though overall 
comparative studies are still in the cradle; practically no one comparison samples all the 
four countries together3. Using a same methodology for comparing Brazilian and Indian 
MNCs (Andreff, 2014) then Russian and Chinese MNCs (Andreff, 2015) has facilitated 
an overall and systematic comparison of OFDI from all four BRICs presented below. 
Such comparison is of interest since Russia and China are transition countries while, at 
about the same time, India and Brazil have liberalised their economies without a post-
communist systemic change. 
Any deep comparison between the four BRICs’ economies will find out so many 
disparities, sometimes more than similarities that the country grouping coined BRIC 
                                                 
1 Wladimir Andreff, Professor Emeritus at the University Paris 1 Panthéon Sorbonne, Honorary Member 
of the European Association for Comparative Economic Studies, Honorary President of the 
International Association of Sports Economists and the European Sports Economics Association, 
former President of the French Economic Association. 
2 Among pioneering references: Andreff (2002 & 2003a), Chudnovsky and Lopez (2000), and Yeung 
(1999).  
3 The comparison here is somewhat more extensive than those available in Duanmu and Guney (2009), 
Goldstein and Pusterla (2010), Milelli, Hay and Shi (2010), Pradhan (2011), Zhao (2011), De Beule and 
Van den Bulcke (2012), Kothari, Kotabe and Murphy (2013). Holtbrügge and Kreppel (2012) indeed 
cover all the four BRICs’ OFDI together though only with case studies of eight companies. 
EJCE, vol.12, n.2 (2015) 
 
 
Available online at http://eaces.liuc.it 
80 
may appear heterogeneous enough to contest that gathering the four countries together 
is relevant. In the same vein, the present paper unveils a number of significant 
differences between OFDI strategies conducted by MNCs from different BRICs, 
beyond some marked similarities. A sensible expectation would be to consider that 
Russian and Chinese MNCs, since they are based in two post-communist economies in 
transition toward some kind of state capitalism, should be closer in terms of OFDI 
strategies while Brazilian and Indian MNCs operating from freer market economies 
should have together more similar features and strategies that would differentiate them 
from their Russian and Chinese competitors. The outcome of the comparison led in this 
article does not entirely confirm such expectation: BRICs’ MNCs similarities and 
differences do not draw a clear-cut dividing line between transitional MNCs and 
emerging MNCs that emanate from more liberalized, though not fully-fledged, market 
economies like Brazil and India. 
OFDI is compared across the BRICs first in terms of historical emergence 
(Section 1), then as regard how it has boomed in the early 2000s and is muddling 
through the current financial crisis (Section 2). Specificities of their MNCs’ strategies are 
pointed out (Section 3), including their geographical (Section 4) and industrial 
distribution (Section 5), as well as the respective determinants of their OFDI as they 
show up from surveying a sample of econometric tests (Section 6). Finally, the role of 
home-country government vis-à-vis home-based MNCs is differentiated (Section 7). 
Conclusion grasps some main comparative results (Section 8). 
1. The emergence of multinational companies based in BRICs 
Indian and Brazilian firms are known to have started up investing abroad earlier 
than Chinese and Russian MNCs. According to Lall (1983), the first OFDI from India 
occurred as early as 1962 with Jay Engineering Works setting an assembly line for 
sewing machines in Sri Lanka. Actually, the first one was the establishment of a textile 
mill in Ethiopia by Birla in 1955 (Saikia, 2012). Indian firms begun to significantly invest 
abroad in the 1960s, but India’s restrictive OFDI regime limited them to small joint 
ventures (JVs) in developing countries such as Kenya, Uganda, Nigeria, Malaysia 
Thailand and Sri Lanka. Liberalisation of OFDI policy pushed up Indian firms to invest 
abroad though under stringent conditions fixed by the state. A major objective of the 
new policy was to developing JVs rather than fully-owned subsidiaries. Indian OFDI 
was felt – by the government – as a tool for export promotion in the equipment goods 
industry. This drove market seeking OFDI primarily to neighbouring host countries, but 
also in the Middle-East and a few African countries, with a focus on countries having a 
significant number of people with Indian origins as local residents. Compared to other 
BRICs’ MNCs, the Indian ones have been benefiting from a first mover advantage4. 
A classical presentation of India’s OFDI in historical perspective splits it into 
three phases (Hansen, 2010). The first phase (1970s-1980s) was mainly led by modest 
investments made in JVs in Asia and Africa and shaped by political and regulatory 
restrictive government policies. Some MNCs were partially or fully state-owned but 
                                                 
4 Major Indian MNCs in the 1980s were Birla, Thapar, Tata group, JK Group, Modi, Hindustan Machine 
Tools, Usha Martin Black, Kirloskar, Shahibag, Godrej, Larsen & Toubro, Sarabhai, Indian Tobacco, 
Mahindra & Mahindra, Nowrosjee Wadia, and Mafatlal. 
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most were held by Indian family capital though often in collaboration with public 
financial institutions. Second was a start-up phase (1990s-early 2000s) which was largely 
an outcome of more liberal government stance on FDI. Liberalisation of the Indian 
economy in the 1990s targeted inward and outward FDI since 1994. The number of 
Indian firms investing abroad grew up. The emergence of new Indian MNCs has been 
boosted by a preliminary substantial inward FDI of Western MNCs into India in tune 
with the so-called LLL - Linkage, Leverage, and Learning - approach (Matthews, 2002). 
Instilling spill-overs, incubators and learning by doing business with foreign investors in 
India have pushed the internationalisation of Indian firms. With the 1998-2002 
downturn of the Indian economy, Indian firms internationalised their operations not 
only for survival but with specific strategies for sustained growth (Kant, 2008). The 
third was a take-off phase (after early 2000s) when Indian OFDI exhibited a totally 
different trend as compared to the previous two phases in terms of growth, industrial 
composition, and geographical orientation. 
Brazilian companies started investing abroad in the 1970s. Domestic economic 
slowdown of the late 1970s and the 1980s’ crisis are main reasons mentioned by 
Brazilian entrepreneurs to explain this first wave of Brazilian OFDI; it played as a push 
factor for Brazilian firms to internationalise. Banks, engineering service firms and 
Petrobrás expanded their activities to bordering countries. Between 1975 and 1980, a 
dozen Brazilian MNCs had already emerged (Andreff, 1982). The Brazilian Central 
Bank data show that 54% of FDI outflows were concentrated in financial services in 
1980. A strong presence of banking investments overseas was strategically targeted to 
support the expansion of Brazilian firms’ exports. Besides, first Brazilian MNCs were 
involved in industries such as oil exploration and production, construction and 
engineering, and a few manufacturing namely in the agro-food industry. Main 
destinations of Brazil’s OFDI were Latin America, Africa and the Middle East. Villela 
(1983) provides a list of the largest non-financial investors abroad in the 1980s5. 
In the 1990s, large Brazilian companies have entered a new stage in their 
internationalisation process (Cyrino et al., 2010). OFDI flows soared as a consequence 
of deregulation, privatisation and trade liberalisation followed by new Brazil’s outward 
economic orientation. By the late 1990s, due to economic and institutional reforms, a 
growing internationalisation of Brazilian firms was registered; OFDI was triggered by a 
strategy of expanding business in foreign markets which has particularly developed after 
2002, corresponding to a recovery of Brazilian economy from the 2001 crisis (Amal and 
Tomio, 2012). 
Though lagging behind the emergence of Indian and Brazilian MNCs, Chinese 
MNCs held a first mover advantage compared to MNCs from all other transition 
economies, including those from Russia and Central Eastern European countries 
(CEECs). They have begun establishing subsidiaries abroad as early as 1979, primarily to 
open new export markets (Ye Gang, 1992). Since then they were ahead of Russian 
companies in investing abroad: OFDI from China in 1992 ($7,401 million) was of about 
the same magnitude as the one from Russia in 1998 ($7,385 million). Just like Indian 
MNCs, the growth of mainland China’s MNCs has been led by the LLL approach and 
                                                 
5 Such as Petrobràs (oil and gas), Copersucar (coffee), Mendes Junior (construction), Vale do Rio Doce 
(mining), Camargo Corrêa (engineering), Odebrecht (construction) and Brahma (beverages). 
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past technology transfers from foreign MNCs resulting in productivity spill-overs to 
domestic Chinese firms. In a future last phase, it is expected that China’s OFDI would 
channel comparable transfers and spill-overs from China to developing countries (Lian 
and Ma, 2011). This should make Chinese MNCs more acceptable in this sort of host 
countries. 
Former USSR opened up to inward FDI comparatively later, in 1987, and the 
LLL process did not operate in the 1990s given the bad domestic investment climate in 
Russia (Andreff, 1999a). So-called Soviet “red multinationals” (Hamilton, 1986) 
vanished nearly overnight in the wake of the USSR’s break-up and subsequent 
transformational recession. OFDI stock from the USSR fell from $699 million in 1990 
down close to nil in 1992 and 1993. Paradoxically, number of Russian firms 
spontaneously transformed into MNCs overnight simply because they were located in 
more than one former Soviet republic. Since these republics obtained the status of new 
independent states by end of 1991 or in 1992, a same company located in two or more 
former Soviet republics – it was often so under central planning - became all at once a 
so-called “born multinational” company (Liuhto, 2001). 
From the mid-1990s on, the number of subsidiaries settled abroad by Russian 
firms started growing again, fuelled by a recovery in new FDI outflows from Russia 
(Andreff, 2002). However, if 1994 is the milestone for a new emergence of Russian 
MNCs, one has to wait until end of 1998 Russian financial crash consequences to 
witness a swift growth pace of Russian OFDI stock. Most of the biggest 100 Russian 
firms have gone multinational since 1999 or so. Russian MNCs benefited from global 
accelerated internationalisation in the early 2000s and from a catching-up surge of late-
coming MNCs, previously lagging behind other BRICs’ MNCs in FDI business. 
Let us end up with a paradox: Brazil and primarily India had benefited from a first 
mover advantage, compared to other BRICs, as regard investing abroad. However, at 
the end of the day, in 2009-2013, both countries are lagging behind China and Russia 
whose OFDI in fact benefited from a last mover fast growth since the 1990s – a sort of 
swift catching-up process. 
During the lapse of time they took to emerge from the late 1970s up to the late 
1990s, MNCs from transition and emerging economies, of which BRICs’ MNCs, 
exhibited major features which differentiated them from big MNCs based in developed 
countries, that is: 
• They were not all or not primarily in private ownership; still a significant 
number of them were state-owned; they had not much ownership specific 
advantages over local companies. 
• They had a modest size compared to Western and Japanese MNCs. 
• The government often interfered heavily in their strategies, much more than 
it is used to do in developed countries. 
• The great bulk of their OFDI was located in neighbouring countries or in 
the same geographical region as the home country. 
• The number of countries hosting their foreign subsidiaries was 
comparatively low. 
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• Each of these BRICs’ MNCs had only settled a rather small number of 
subsidiaries abroad. 
• They often had primarily invested abroad in the manufacturing industry 
while big MNCs from developed countries were already privileging the 
services industry for their OFDI. 
• Their profitability was quite below those of big Western and Japanese 
MNCs. 
However, some of these features were used as specific competitive advantages to 
challenge big MNCs from developed countries through market seeking OFDI. Only a 
few BRICs’ MNCs, if any, were investing abroad with an efficiency seeking objective – 
looking for lower unit labour cost abroad - since their domestic production costs were 
comparatively low. Econometric testing (Andreff, 2002 & 2003a) has verified that the 
investment development path – IDP – model (Dunning, 1981; Dunning and Narula, 
1998) fitted with these early stages of emergence of MNCs from transition, emerging 
and developing economies. According to IDP model, in a first stage of its economic 
development, a country hosts very few FDI and does not invest at all abroad. In a 
second stage, it becomes attractive to inward FDI and achieves its very first OFDI, 
being a net FDI importer. In a third stage, due to its new technological competences 
and low unit labour cost, the country attracts very significant inward FDI and its MNCs 
start to substantially invest abroad even though the country still remains net FDI 
importer. In such analytical framework, emerging economies are supposed to definitely 
move from the second to the third stage and even to come close to a fourth stage. In 
the latter, a country is assumed to be a developed one and invest more outwards than it 
is invested by inward FDI; its FDI balance becomes positive. In a fifth and last stage, 
the now post-industrial country roughly reaches a balance between its inward and 
outward FDI. 
2. From the golden early 2000s to muddling through the crisis 
Overall BRICs OFDI growth actually skyrocketed in 2000-2007 (Table 1). Brazil’s 
OFDI had a fast development momentum between 1997 and 2000 in the wake of 
privatisation and deregulation; it multiplied by 7 as against Russian OFDI multiplied by 
3, Indian OFDI multiplied by 2 and Chinese OFDI6 increasing by 33% over 1997-2000. 
Brazilian OFDI stock in 2000-2007 multiplied by 2.5 and grew exactly at the same pace 
as the world OFDI stock overall; consequently, its pace was passed over by OFDI stock 
from China (x 3.5), Russia (x 13) and India (x 16). Despite its impressive growth, Indian 
OFDI stock remained by far quite smaller than the Russian (8 times smaller), Brazilian 
(4 times) and Chinese (3 times) ones in 2007. On the brink of financial crisis, the major 
BRIC investing abroad was Russia whereas the laggard was India, with Brazil and China 
in between. Russian OFDI achieved a world record in terms of growth7 from 2000 to 
2007, growing faster than OFDI from other BRICs.  
                                                 
6 All the comments refer to OFDI from mainland China, Hong Kong OFDI excluded. 
7 Until 2007, Russian MNCs showed a double-digit growth and high profitability (Kalotay, 2008a).The 
dramatic growth of Russian OFDI may be somewhat overestimated due to data collection 
methodology; however the latter improved throughout the 2000s, namely with a better accounting for 
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Table 1 - Outward FDI stock from Brazil, Russia, India, and China 
 ($million) 
BRICs: 1997 2000 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Brazil 7230 51946 129840 162218 157667 180949 202586 232848 293277 
Russia 6410 20141 255211 202837 248894 433655 362101 413159 501202 
India 846 1859 29412 61765 77207 92407 111257 118167 119838 
China (mainland) 20416 27212 95799 147949 229600 297600 365981 509001 613585 
China and Hong Kong 157928 411944 1122386 923869 1063689 1246094 1411901 1818850 1352353 
Source: UNCTAD (2014) and previous issues. 
 
Table 2 - Comparative features of OFDI from the BRICs (in %) 
 Outward FDI stock / GDP Outward / Inward FDI stock 
 BRICs: 1999 2007 2011 1999 2007 2011 
Brazil 1.4 9.9 9.0 7.4 40.0 30.3 
India 0* 2.6 6.0 6.5 38.6 55.2 
Russia 2.3 19.8 19.5 51.9 75.4 79.2 
China 2.5 3.0 5.0 8.4 29.3 51.4 
China & Hong Kong 15.9 30.3 18.7 45.3 74.3 76.3 
* Below 0.1% 
Calculated from UNCTAD's World Investment Reports. 
 
Looking at Table 2 with reference to Dunning’s IDP model, Brazil exhibits a quite 
lower OFDI/GDP ratio than Russia – twice lower from 1999 to 2011 – while it is much 
higher than in India and China which compare in this respect. If an OFDI/GDP ratio 
higher than 5% were assumed to be required for a country to be in the third step of IDP 
model (Andreff, 2003a), Brazil and Russia reached it in the early 2000s while India and 
China attained such step only by 2011. Outward to inward FDI stock ratio is the lowest 
in Brazil and India in 1999; this ratio multiplied by more than 5 in Brazil between 2000 
and 2007 and was only outperformed by Russian OFDI at this date. Due to the crisis, of 
which Brazilian and Russian OFDI suffered more than their Indian and Chinese 
counterparts, in 2011 Brazil was lagging behind India and China as to outward/inward 
FDI stock ratio, and of course Russia. However, if a 25% ratio is hypothetically retained 
for qualifying the third step of IDP model all the BRICs stick to the criterion in 2007 as 
well as in 2011, with only Russia having met it before 1999. 
                                                                                                                                      
cumulative investments made in previous years. Nevertheless, it is not enough to be the sole factor of 
the observed dramatic OFDI growth (Filipov, 2010). 
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The growth of global OFDI stock sharply slowed down during the financial crisis 
in 2008, 2010 and 2011, with uneven recoveries in 2009, 2012 and 2013. The financial 
crisis had a negative impact on OFDI from emerging markets as well. However, 
emerging market MNCs’ contribution to OFDI was more resilient to the crisis and less 
volatile than that of other MNCs. While the growth of overall world OFDI significantly 
and repeatedly fell on average one year out of two (Table 3), OFDI fluctuations were 
scattered among the BRICs during the crisis. 
 
















Brazil x 2.5 24.9% - 2.8% 14.8% 12.0% 14.9% 25.9% 
Russia x 13 - 20.5% 22.7% 74.2% - 16.5% 14.1% 21.3% 
India x 16 110% 25.0% 19.7% 20.4% 6.2% 1.4% 
China x 3.5 54.4% 55.2% 29.6% 23.0% 39.1% 20.5% 
China & Hong Kong x 2.7 - 17.7% 15.1% 17.1% 13.3% 28.8% -25.6% 
World OFDI x 2.5 3.9% 17.1% 7.5% 3.7% 11.3% 11.5% 
Calculated from UNCTAD (2014) and previous issues. 
 
Russian OFDI stock was by far the most unstable and the most affected by crisis 
suffering a 20% decrease in 2008, and again 17% down in 2011; but in between its 
recovery was the strongest in the world with the highest growth rate (74%) in 2010; the 
2012-2013 recovery is milder. Russian OFDI was harshly affected by the crisis with a 
cut in its stock value (not only a fall in outflows), due to both divestments from abroad 
and foreign asset depreciation in 2008. Russian MNCs have been stifled by a lack of 
external finance. Russian OFDI stock grew again in 2010 fuelled by new investments 
abroad, foreign asset appreciation and likely capital flight. These figures exhibit that 
crisis entailed a much higher instability in Russian than other BRICs’ OFDI. The rouble 
depreciation since 2014 is bad news for further OFDI expansion. 
Though fluctuating, Chinese OFDI stock kept on growing at between 21% and 
55% a rate per year from 2008 to 2013: the most stable and the least affected by crisis. 
Chinese OFDI stock did better than other BRICs’ OFDI so that it slightly passed over 
the value of the Russian one since 2011. Its rate of growth remained significantly higher 
than in other BRICs just like the annual rate of Chinese domestic economic growth 
which did not fall below 7% so far – much higher than in other BRICs’ economies. 
Moreover Chinese OFDI has been facilitated by a strong domestic currency – all the 
more so with remminbi being often assessed as undervalued at official exchange rate. 
Brazilian and Indian OFDI stocks stand in between. Brazilian OFDI stock is the 
most unstable after the Russian one, decreasing by 3% in 2009 then sticking to a 12% to 
15% growth rate until 2012 and reaching 26% in 2013. The high growth rate of 
Brazilian OFDI stock in 2008 was mainly due to intra-company loans from parent 
companies to underperforming subsidiaries abroad as well as new acquisitions of mining 
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and natural-resource-based industries. In 2009, in response to worldwide crisis, FDI 
outflows from Brazil were negative, with Brazilian parent companies repatriating $10 
billion from their foreign subsidiaries through intra-company transfers. The 
combination of Brazilian real depreciation and loss of market value of overseas equity 
did not result in more ventures abroad for Brazilian companies. The latter were strongly 
hit by tightened international credit conditions and uncertainty fueled by the crisis. 
Trans-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As) by Brazilian MNCs plummeted sharply 
in 2009. Since 2010, Brazilian OFDI stock located in Europe has considerably raised 
namely in Austria, through special purpose entities and takeovers of Austrian banks. 
Indian OFDI rate of growth peaked up at 98% per year in 2004-2007. Indian 
OFDI stock was still one of the fastest growing in the world in 2008 but dropped off 
significantly in 2009 and since then its growth rate is on a decreasing slope down to 6% 
in 2012 and 1% in 2013. This growth rate declined, on average, less than in other BRICs 
but China. Indian MNCs had borrowed heavily in dollars to finance mega trans-border 
M&As. They were thus hit badly by the sharp rupee depreciation and tightened 
international credit conditions. Since 2008 continuously tumbling trans-border M&As 
by Indian MNCs were driving the decline in OFDI growth. After years of overseas 
expansion, Indian MNCs started consolidating their foreign operations and adjusting to 
the crisis. They suffered from a credit crunch and difficulties in raising financial 
resources. However, after Chinese MNCs, Indian ones are the least affected by crisis 
among the BRICs’ MNCs so far. 
In terms of OFDI stock, India became the world’s 34th largest outward investor 
in 2007 whereas Brazil had reached the 19th rank the same year as against Russia the 
12th, and mainland China the 23rd. In 2012, Brazil was the 18th most important source 
of OFDI worldwide and India the 23rd, as against Russia being the 15th and China the 
12th. From 2007 to 2012, during the crisis, all the BRICs have climbed this ranking 
based on UNCTAD data, except Russia. 
3. Specificities of multinational companies from Brazil, Russia, India and 
China 
3.1 Global players and small-medium sized firms: Brazilian multinationals 
In 2006, 885 identified Brazilian MNCs had invested in 52 countries where they 
were employing 77,000 people; Gammeltoft (2008) even identified more than 1,000 
Brazilian firms that had invested abroad in the late 1990s. The group of Brazilian firms 
with significant amounts of OFDI is around 100 of which about 50 global players 
(Carvalho et al., 2010). In 2013, seven Brazilian MNCs were listed among the Fortune 500 
biggest companies in the world: Petrobras, Banco de Brasil, Bradesco, Vale, JBS, Itau, 
Ultrapar Holdings, and Brazilian Distribution. Major Brazilian companies investing 
abroad are listed in Table 4 but quite smaller or less known Brazilian firms invest abroad 
as well. Overall, Brazilian MNCs form a mixed sample of global players and small and 
medium-sized enterprises. 
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Table 4 - The biggest Brazilian multinationals, 2009-2010 






Itau-Unibanco (Itausa) Banking 50.0 75.2 
Vale Mining 46.1 55.6 
Odebrecht Construction 24.4 n.a. 
Petrobras Oil and gas 20.4 17.9 
Gerdau Steel 14.3 15.1 
Grupo Votorantim Conglomerate 9.1 15.8 
JBS-Friboi Food 9.1 10.7 
Embraer Aerospace 3.7 3.1 
CSN Steel 2.2 n.a. 
Marfrig Food 1.4 2.5 
Andrade Guttierez Construction 0.7 n.a. 
Brasil Foods Food 0.6 3.6 
Marco Polo Automotive 0.5 0.2 
WEG Machinery 0.4 0.8 
FIBRIA Pulp and paper 0.3 n.a. 
Braskem Chemicals 0.1 n.a. 
Metalfrio Electrical equipment 0.1 n.a. 
Natura Cosmetics 0.1 0.04 
Lupatech Machinery 0.1 n.a. 
ALL Logistica Railroad transportation 0.1 n.a. 
Totvs Information technology 0.02 n.a. 
Bematech Information technology 0.002 n.a. 
Banco do Brazil Banking n.a. 32.7 
Bradesco Banking n.a. 26.2 
Industrias Romi Machinery n.a. 0.8 
Magnesita Mining n.a. 0.7 
Source: Columbia FDI Profiles 
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Since the very beginning, Brazilian MNCs had adopted either an export-
substitution or an export-complementing OFDI strategy that is a market seeking 
strategy in any case. The latter was fueled in the long run by trade liberalisation at home 
and abroad. Brazilian MNCs invest abroad by means of both greenfield investment and 
trans-border M&As. Overseas acquisitions have gained strength, due to the stabilisation 
of the Brazilian economy and a temporary appreciation of real against the US dollar. An 
appreciated currency has made M&As cheaper. Brazilian MNCs have taken this 
opportunity to expand their market and access natural resources that are not available in 
domestic market: this was the purpose for instance of Vale-Inco Steel, Votorantim-US 
Zinc, and Gerdau-Chaparral Steel acquisitions. 
 
Table 5 – A Sample of significant trans-border mergers-acquisitions achieved by Brazilian companies, 
2008-2010 
Brazilian acquirer Acquired company Target country Industry acquired % 
Value 
$million 
Vale BSRG Resources Guinea UK Ferroalloy ores 51 2500 
Marfrig Keystone Foods USA Meat packing 100 1260 
Votorantim Cimpor Cimentos Portugal Cement, hydraulic 17 982 
DHC Outsourcing Diveo Braodband Networks USA Information retriev. 100 422 
Votorantim Métais Cia Minera Milpo Peru Copper ores 15 419 
Petrobras Pasadena Refining System USA Petroleum refining 50 350 
Braskem Sunoco Chemicals USA Chemicals 100 350 
Votorantim Cimpor Cimentos Portugal Cement, hydraulic 4 210 
Petrobras Devon Energy CorpCascade USA Petroleum and gas 50 180 
Camargo Correa Cimpor Cimentos Portugal Cement, hydraulic 3 180 
Banco Itau 
Holding 
Banco Itau Europa Portugal Security services 89 498 
Petrobras Esso Chile Petrolera Chile Petroleum refining n.a. 400 
Vale Cementos Argos Colombia Cement, hydraulic 100 373 
Votorantim Cementos Avellaneda Argentina Cement 50 202 
Banco Bradesco Banco Espirito Santo Portugal Banking 6 32 
Suzano Holding MDS SGPS Portugal Insurance 50 71 
Vale TEAL Explorat. & Mining Canada Copper ores 50 66 
Marfrig Grupo Zenda Uruguay Leather products 51 49 
Petrobras Chevron Chile Chile Petroleum and coal 100 12 
JBS-Friboi Pilgrim's Pride USA Food 64 3 
Gerdau Quanex Corp USA Steel 100 1749 
Magnesita LWB Refractories Germany Brick and clay tile 100 944 
JBS-Friboi Smithfield Beef Group USA Beef cattle 100 565 
JBS-Friboi Inalca Italy Meat products 50 425 
Votorantim Métais US Zinc Corp USA Nonferrous metals 100 295 
Gerdau Corporacion Sidenor Spain Steel 20 287 
AmBev Quilmes Industrial Argentina Malt beverages 6 252 
JBS-Friboi Tasman Group Services Australia Meat packing 100 150 
Gerdau Corsa Controladora Mexico Steel 49 101 
Source: Campanario, Stal & Silva (2012). 
W. Andreff, Outward Foreign Direct Investment from BRIC countries: Comparing strategies of Brazilian, 
Russian, Indian and Chinese multinational companies 
 
Available online at http://eaces.liuc.it 
89 
From Table 5 one can infer that trans-border M&As by Brazilian MNCs target 
foreign companies geared towards consumer markets (food, services, banking), which 
confirms market-oriented OFDI. Then come M&As for acceding natural resources 
(petroleum, gas, various ores), and just one trans-border M&A is asset seeking in 
information retrieval; this highlights a resource seeking OFDI strategy. Thus, 
predominantly Brazilian MNCs’ strategy is market seeking, to some extent resource 
seeking and to a much lesser degree, and only recently, technological asset seeking, less 
than 10% of declared OFDI motives. There is no sign of an efficiency seeking strategy 
with relocating production units in low unit labour cost countries. Despite the rise of 
some big investors, mostly in the extractive sector, Brazilian MNCs have not yet 
developed a global strategy8, much less than other BRICs’ MNCs. 
Searching technological assets that firms do not avail in their domestic market is 
an important driver of OFDI in general, and has become a central motivation for 
emerging market firms to internationalise (Dunning et al., 2008; Dunning and Lundan, 
2008). But in Brazil, technology seeking OFDI responds of only 7.2 percent of sampled 
MNCs (Carvalho, 2009). The recent increase in trans-border M&As might be a signal 
that Brazilian MNCs are seeking now to augment their strategic position through 
investment in technological assets. Tolentino (2000) contends that Brazilian MNCs had 
the disadvantage of not having global brands (in some cases not even strong national 
brands) and, most important, had neither attained worldwide technological leadership 
nor developed significant technological advantage to compete abroad. However, some 
Brazilian MNCs have significantly invested in R&D expenditures abroad, but not yet in 
very high tech industries like MNCs from developed countries and some Indian or 
Chinese MNCs. Galina and Moura (2013) found that Brazilian MNCs basically 
internationalise Product Development (not the whole R&D process) while Research 
properly speaking remains at the headquarters in Brazil. Adaptation of products to local 
markets is often observed as a factor that led to internationalise R&D. 
Partnership with local suppliers was used for product or technology development. 
Maehler et al. (2011) have shown that in four Brazilian subsidiaries located in Portugal, 
in different industries, frequent innovations take place which are typically incremental in 
nature and occur in strong interaction with local markets, especially with customers 
contributing with suggestions and influence on the new products’ creation in the 
subsidiaries. At odds with Russian and Chinese MNCs strategy of tapping technological 
assets abroad, Fleury et al. (2013) contend that Brazilian MNCs derive innovative 
capabilities from core competences and competence formation at firm level which are 
influenced by the national environment. Thus Brazilian MNCs which do not exhibit the 
expected strength in R&D are able to combine their organisational competences and 
manage to develop innovative capabilities as a springboard for their internationalisation. 
                                                 
8 As defined in Andreff (2003b). 
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3.2 Conglomerates and family groups: Indian multinationals 
In 2007, the number of Indian MNCs stood at 3,149 operating across 122 
countries, but many had a relatively small size. In 2008, seven Indian firms were listed in 
the Fortune 500 biggest companies of the world: Indian Oil, Reliance Industries, Bharat 
Petroleum, Hindustan Petroleum, Tata Steel, Oil and Natural Gas Corporation and 
State Bank of India. In 2013, they were eight, the same plus Tata Motors. Some of these 
biggest Indian firms did not show up among the biggest Indian MNCs in 2006 (Table 
6). 
Early Indian OFDI was market seeking and concentrated in developing countries 
where there was little technological competition. Indian MNCs invested abroad largely 
to circumvent a stagnant domestic market and policy restrictions on large firms’ growth 
stemming from the Monopolies and Trade Restrictive Practices Act, the Foreign 
Exchange Regulation Act, and licensing regulation and reservation policies for public-
owned and small scale sector (Pradhan, 2008). Indian firms investing abroad before the 
1990s were mostly conglomerates (Lall, 1982) competing into those industries that 
required simple technology, low product differentiation and labour intensive techniques 
in developing countries. After a first liberalisation phase, continual industrialisation in 
the domestic market, experience attained from home and abroad, financial relaxation 
and local government supports paved the way for Indian MNCs to invest more globally, 
including increasingly into developed countries since the 1990s (Arockia Baskaran and 
Chaarlas, 2012). A number of Indian MNCs attempted globalising their businesses and 
revenue sources as a means for reducing dependence on the Indian market and 
domestic business cycle. 
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Table 6 - The biggest Indian multinationals, 2006 
 ($ million)  
Company Industry Foreign assets 
Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) Oil and gas 4700 
Tata Group Conglomerate 4200 
Videocon Industries Conglomerate 1600 
Ranbaxy Laboratories Pharmaceuticals 1000 
Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories Pharmaceuticals 870 
HCL Technologies IT services 780 
Hindalco Industries Aluminum manufacturing 580 
Sun Pharmaceuticals Pharmaceuticals 280 
Reliance Industries Oil and gas 250 
Suzlon Energy Power and energy 140 
Larsen and Toubro Engineering, construction 130 
WIPRO Technologies IT services 130 
Bharat Forge Auto component forging 110 
Patni Computer Systems IT services 81 
Hexaware Technologies IT services 70 
Biocon Limited Pharmaceuticals 50 
i-Gate Global Solutions IT services 49 
Max India Limited Conglomerate 37 
Mahindra & Mahindra Automotive 35 
NIIT Limited IT services 31 
Piramal Healthcare Limited Pharmaceuticals 26 
Birlasoft (India) Limited IT services 21 
Raymond Limited Fabric manufacturing 18 
Infosys Technologies Limited IT services 9 
Source: Satyanand & Raghavendran (2010). 
 
Then, Indian OFDI became more high-tech and trade supporting, as Indian IT 
firms begun to win large global contracts and relocated in developed countries to be 
close to key clients. Indian pharmaceutical firms followed such route to break into 
Western generic markets. India’s pharmaceutical companies looked for new unregulated 
markets for their generic drugs while seeking to acquire facilities that have regulatory 
clearance in regulated markets such as the USA and Western Europe. The conglomerate 
structure of some well-known Indian MNCs is considered as a key factor of their 
success (Ruet, 2010). It helped them catching up as regard production process-efficiency 
and technology while raising their borrowing capacity in international markets. Those 
non-conglomerate Indian firms that became MNCs often used foreign networks, 
namely parental networks (Elango and Pattnaik, 2007) of big families like the Kalyani’s 
(Bharat Forge), the Mahindra brothers, Dilip Shanghvi (Sun Pharmaceuticals), or 
Nicholas Piramal. 
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Some Indian MNCs have persistently pursued natural resources. Resource seeking 
OFDI aims at ensuring a stable and secure supply of resources to fuel the country’s 
energy-intensive growth. There has recently been a surge in resource seeking OFDI by 
Indian MNCs, especially to acquire energy resources in Australia, Indonesia and Africa. 
Indian OFDI to the US and Western Europe has taken off since 2000. The major driver 
of this takeoff is to get an access to better R&D, skill infrastructure, and strategic assets. 
This (technological) asset seeking strategy reflects an aspiration by Indian MNCs to buy 
technology, processes, and management know-how. Finally, as trade barriers declined, 
some Indian MNCs undertook industrial restructuring with creating regional production 
networks, which looks like an efficiency seeking strategy though it is not heavily based 
on a search for lower unit labour cost9. Indian IT companies have established major 
global sourcing bases in China. Similarly, Tata Motors’ acquisition of Daewoo Heavy 
Vehicles of South Korea in 2005 has led to a regional production networking strategy 
whereby small and medium-sized vehicles are manufactured in Indian plants and sold 
through Daewoo outlets and brands while, simultaneously, heavy trucks built at the 
Daewoo plant are sold by Tata outlets in India and other countries under Tata brand 
name. 
Though relatively small in a global context, Indian MNCs are noticeable for their 
buy-outs of foreign enterprises far larger than themselves. Indian MNCs started being 
seriously involved into overseas M&As in the 2000s (Table 7). They have systematically 
acquired leading firms in developed countries to boost domain expertise, technological 
competitiveness, market size, and brand recognition. In some cases, these acquisitions 
were specifically undertaken to attain global size and status, and to build new 
competitive advantages by combining the best international technology with low-cost 
Indian labour (Andreff and Balcet, 2013). Severe domestic competition triggered 
increasingly larger strategic asset-seeking trans-border M&As in the automotive 
industry, auto-components, electronics, electrical machinery and the metals sector, 
including the acquisition of established and prestigious brands, for example, Tata 
Motors’ purchase of Jaguar and Ford assets. While the largest overseas M&As were 
smaller than $500 million in the early 2000s, they became bigger than $10 billion after 
the mid-2000s with the record takeover of Arcelor by Mittal ($47 billion). Many Indian 
firms also used M&As to bring home new products and services and build competitive 
strength in India. Improving competitiveness also explains the dominance of natural 
resource seeking investments in India’s recent trans-border M&As. 
A survey of Indian MNCs revealed that market access was the most significant 
motive of their OFDI for 51% of the respondents, followed by efficiency seeking 
(22%), resource seeking (13%) and created-asset seeking (14%) (Nayyar, 2008). 
 
                                                 
9 Since a low unit labour cost is a typical home country’s advantage for Indian MNCs.  
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Table 7 – A sample of significant trans-border mergers-acquisitions achieved by Indian companies, 2006-2010 
Indian Acquired  Target  Acquired Value 
acquirer company country  Industry % $million 
Mittal Steel Arcelor Luxembourg Metals & mining 100 47440 
Tata Steel Corus Group U. K. Metals & mining 100 14850 
Bharti Airtel Zain Africa* Telecom 100 9000 
Hindalco Industries Novelis Canada Metals & mining 100 6000 
ONGC Imperial Energy U. K. Energy & power 100 2800 
Sterlite Industries India Asarco United States Mining n.a. 2600 
Tata Motors Jaguar & Land Rover U. K. Automotive 100 2300 
Suzlon Energy Repower Systems Germany energy & power 66 1700 
Essar Global Algoma Steel Canada Metals & mining 100 1570 
ONGC Petrobras Brazil Oil and gas n.a. 1400 
Tata Power Kaltim Prima Coal Indonesia Metals & mining 30 1300 
United Spirits Whyte and Mackay U. K. Food, beverage 100 1180 
Tata Power PT Bumi Resources Thailand Energy & power n.a. 1100 
GMR Infrastructure Intergen  Netherlands Energy & power 50 1100 
Tata Chemicals General ChemicalIndustrial United States Plastic,chemicals 100 1100 
JSW Steel Jindal United Steel United States Metals & mining 90 900 
HCL EAS Axon Group U. K. IT & ITES 100 800 
Wipro Infocrossing United States IT & ITES 100 600 
Rain Calcining CII Carbon United States Energy & power 100 600 
DS Constructions Globeleq Bermuda Energy & power 100 600 
Dr Reddy's Laboratories Betapharm Germany Parmaceuticals n.a. 582 
Tata Tea Tetley Group U. K. Food, beverage n.a. 431 
Videocon/Bharat Petro Encana Brasil Petroleo Brazil Energy & power 50 400 
Ranbaxy Laboratories Trapia Romania Parmaceuticals n.a. 324 
Firstsource Solutions MedAssist United States IT & ITES 100 300 
RelianceCommunications Yipes Holding United States Telecom 100 300 
Videocon Appliances Thomson Multimedia France  IT & ITES n.a. 292 
Wockhardt Negma Laboratories France  Parmaceuticals 100 265 
Jubilant Organosys Draxis Health Canada Pharmaceuticals n.a. 258 
Kiri Dyes and Chemicals DyStar Group Germany Plastic,chemicals 100 200 
Essar Group Warid Telecom Uganda/Congo Telecom 51 200 
United Phosphorus Cerexagri France  Chemicals n.a. 142 
Subex Systems Azure Solutions U. K. Technology n.a. 140 
Inox India Cryogenic VesselInitiatives United States Logistics 51 100 
S. Kumar's Hartmarx United States Textiles,apparels 100 100 
* In 17 African countries 
Sources: UNCTAD, Hattari & Rajan (2010). 
3.3 From opacity to globalisation: Russian multinationals 
An unknown number – probably less than 1,000 Russian firms10 - have invested abroad. Despite their growing size, no one Russian 
MNC has entered yet the list of top 100 biggest non-financial MNCs ranked by UNCTAD according to the value of their foreign assets 
(Table 8). Russian MNCs were used to disclose very little information with regards to their economic activity abroad. This strategy of opacity, 
non-transparency and information concealment is a typical feature of Russian MNCs, even though it is stepping back now. 
                                                 
10 The exact number of Russian multinational parent companies is not well known; the UNCTAD reckoned 1,176 foreign subsidiaries of Russian companies in 2004. 
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Table 8 – The biggest Russian multinationals, 2004-2009 
Company, 2004* Foreign assets Company, 2007* Foreign assets Company 2009** Revenue Rank*** 
Lukoil 10579 Lukoil 20805 Gazprom 67806 12 
Gazprom 2951 Gazprom 17236 Lukoil 49654 23 
Sovcomflot 1762 Norilsk Nickel 12843 Rosneft 25325 57 
Norilsk Nickel 1413 Evraz 6221 TNK-BP 24124 61 
MTS 994 Severstal 5130 Gazpromneft 14758 106 
Rusal 743 Sovcomflot 4874 Surgutneftegaz 13584 114 
FESCO 675 Rusal 4533 Sistema 13015 118 
Severstal 666 MTS (Sistema) 3812 Severstal 9529 164 
PriSCO 657 Vimpelcom 3572 IDGC 9299 168 
Vimpelcom 602 Novolipetsk Steel 1594 Tatneft 8629 177 
TNK-BP 438 PriSCO 1208 Norilsk Nickel 7302 197 
OMZ 347 TNK-BP 1150 MTS 7064 203 
InterRAO 261 FESCO 1055 Evraz 6783 210 
Acron  119 OAO Koks 978 Transneft 6478 224 
RitzioEntertainment 47 Eurochem 901 X 5 Retail 6363 227 
Alrosa 31 InterRAO 799 Vimpelcom 6353 228 
Sitronics 31 TMK 606 Rusal 5871 245 
Evraz  0 Mirax 470 AvtoVAZ 4525 284 
Novolipetsk Steel 0 GAZ 384 Novolipetsk Steel 4482 288 
IMH/OAO Koks 0 ChTPZ 262 Mechel 4138 306 
Eurochem 0 Acron 261 GAZ Avto 4015 312 
TMK 0 Alrosa 231 Magnit 3908 317 
Mirax 0 Sitronics (Sistema) 226 Magnitogorsk Steel 3709 327 
ChTPZ 0 OMZ 207 Bashneft 2872 394 
GAZ .. RitzioEntertainment 200 Aeroflot 2718 416 
Rushydro 2621 431 
Mosenergo 2590 441 
Salavatnefteorgsintez 2471 457 
Slavneft 2460 461 
Sources: * Skolkovo (2008) in million $. 
** Handelsblatt Research 2010: in million €. 
*** rank among the biggest 500 European companies. 
TMK 2402 474 
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Table 9 - A sample of significant trans-border mergers-acquisitions achieved by Russian companies, 2005-2010 
Buyer Acquired Target Industry acquired Value 
 company country  % million $ 
Norilsk Nickel Lion Ore Mining Canada Mining, metallurgy 100 5650 
Vimpelcom ZAO Kyivstar GSM Ukraine Telecommunication 100 5500 
Evraz IPSCO Canada Canada Mining, metallurgy 100 4200 
Rusal SUAL Glencore Switzerland Metallurgy n.a. 3600 
Altimo Turkcell Turkey Telecommunication 13 3200 
Gazprom Beltransgaz Belarus Oil, gas 50 2500 
Evraz Oregon Steel USA Mining, metallurgy 100 2300 
Evraz Sukhaya Balka GOK Ukraine Iron ore 99 2189 
Lukoil Nelson Resources United Kingdom Oil, gas 100 2000 
Lukoil ISAB Italy Oil, gas 49 1850 
Renova Oerlikon Switzerland High tech 45 1600 
Alfa Group Turkcell Turkey Telecommunication 7 1600 
Mechel Oriel Resources United Kingdom Mining, metallurgy 47 1500 
Norilsk Nickel Gold Fields Ltd South Africa Mining, metallurgy 20 1200 
TMK IPSCO Tubulars USA Steel pipes, tubes 100 1200 
Severstal Penfold Capital Acq. Canada Finance 95 1115 
Severstal Esmark USA Mining, metallurgy 100 978 
Pyaterochka Holding Formata Holding Netherlands Grocery stores 100 940 
Gazprom NIS Serbia Oil, gas 51 900 
Severstal PBS Coal USA Mining, metallurgy 100 877 
Novolipetsk Steel Duferco USA & EU Metallurgy n.a. 806 
NMLK Steel Invest Finance USA, IT, BEL Mining, metallurgy 50 800 
Severstal Sparrows Point USA Mining, metallurgy 100 775 
Renova Sulzer Switzerland Machinery 32 725 
Severstal Lucchini Spa Italy Metallurgy n.a. 700 
Renova Energetic Source Italy Electricity 80 700 
Evraz Highvel Steel South Africa Mining, metallurgy 79 678 
Evraz Palini & Partoli Italy Mining, metallurgy 75 620 
Lukoil SNG Holdings Uzbekistan Oil, gas 100 575 
Lukoil Jet Petrol Stations CZ,PL,HU, FIN Oil, gas n.a. 560 
Basic Element Hochtief AG Germany Metallurgy n.a. 525 
Vimpelcom ArmenTel Armenia Telecommunication 100 500 
Global Info. Services Altis semiconductors France Machinery n.a. 449 
Severstal WCI Steel Inc. USA Mining, metallurgy 100 443 
Rusal Eurallumina Spa Italy Metallurgy n.a. 420 
Norilsk Nickel OMG Nickel Assets AU & FIN Metallurgy n.a. 408 
Severstal Celtic Resources Plc Ireland Mining n.a. 315 
Evraz Vikovice Steel Czech Republic Machinery n.a. 287 
Amtel Vredestein Banden Netherlands Chemicals n.a. 201 
Source: adapted from UNCTAD, Filipov (2010) and Vahtra (2010). 
 
The expansion of Russian MNCs abroad has often been interpreted in a first phase as capital runaway, if not exodus, toward friendly 
more stable and less risky foreign investment climates than in the Russian domestic market (Bulatov, 1998; Vahtra and Liuhto, 2004). 
Following up the former red multinationals developed to serve Soviet foreign trade purposes, a rather frequent strategy of Russian 
MNCs is market seeking OFDI relaying previous export. This strategy first pertains to traditional markets such as the CIS; it is also the 
rationale for Russian OFDI in Western markets where Russian products face tough competition. Those Russian MNCs which invest abroad 
in mining, oil and gas industries have adopted a resource seeking approach and attempted to take over their most needed suppliers abroad by 
means of M&As. Russian OFDI in the CIS is basically resource seeking geared towards oil, gas and mining. The same strategy applies to the 
fairly recent Russian OFDI in Africa though it is mitigated here with a motive of accessing to new consumer markets. Russian MNCs have 
not yet adopted an efficiency seeking strategy although they could have envisaged it in the CIS and developing countries with lower 
production costs than in Russia. 
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Russian companies have conducted an asset seeking strategy based on overseas 
M&As in view of acquiring Western technology and R&D intensive units. Trans-border 
M&As enable them to consolidate their global competitiveness in creating or reaching 
the advantages of a monopoly or dominant oligopoly position in some foreign markets. 
The main target for M&As by Russian MNCs is to take over European and North 
American firms. Between 2005 and 2010, M&As have primarily targeted an entry in 
industries linked to natural resources in the U.S., Canada, Italy, Switzerland and South 
Africa (Table 9). Big trans-border M&As are less frequent in the close abroad whose 
firms are of smaller size and less attractive in terms of high tech assets. The proportion 
of M&As in Europe peaked up in 1997-2000 whereas the one in the CIS climaxed in 
2001-2004. First asset acquisitions appeared in developing countries since 2005. 
Financial crisis impacted M&As undertaken by Russian MNCs downwards. The overall 
number of trans-border M&A deals was 114 in 2007 and 119 in 2008; it fell down to 
102 in 2009 and 70 in 2010 (Filipov, 2011). 
OFDI by Russian MNCs directly in R&D is less the rule than exception so far, 
but it is a significant sign of a step forward toward a more global strategy. For instance, 
Sistema entered the stock equity of an Indian company in the mobile telecom industry 
in 2008 and then attempted to acquire a German firm involved in microelectronics, 
Infineon, in 2009 (Vahtra, 2010). Similarly Sberbank had attempted (but failed) to 
participate into the purchase of Opel, a General Motors subsidiary, during the 
bankruptcy proceeding of this company, in view of capturing its high tech. In the iron 
and steel industry, Evraz, Severstal and Rusal have invested a big deal of money for 
technological development in their foreign subsidiaries whereas, in oil industry, Lukoil 
and TNK-BP have acquired foreign firms in view of upgrading their own technological 
level. This spread of overseas M&As by Russian MNCs in high-tech industries was 
backed and supported by the highest Russian authorities. 
3.4 Predominant state ownership: Chinese multinationals 
In 2005, 3,429 parent companies of Chinese MNCs had settled about 28,000 
foreign subsidiaries. Most of the biggest Chinese MNCs are state-owned and backed by 
governmental financial assistance while private ones are fast-growing and even faster-
globalising (Table 10). State-owned enterprises (SOEs) and privately-owned MNCs 
differentiate with regards to their motives of internationalisation since the government 
influence is absolutely decisive on the former while looser with the latter. 
Chinese SOEs are attracted in countries with big markets or large endowment in 
natural resources and rather risky political environment. Private MNCs are more purely 
market seekers. Although all Chinese public and private firms have strategic intent with 
asset seeking, the attraction is toward commercially viable technology rather than core 
research content. Such technological asset seeking strategy is primarily adopted when 
investing in advanced developed economies where Chinese MNCs are motivated by an 
access to strategic assets corresponding to China’s strategic needs (Deng, 2007). Chinese 
MNCs are often portrayed as internationalising in order to improve their access to 
foreign proprietary technology and enhance competitiveness through diversifying their 
activity. Asset seeking has been used on purpose. With domestic wage inflation in the 
recent years, some Chinese companies started relocating their production in 
geographically close countries with markedly lower unit labour costs such as Vietnam 
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and North Korea. This signals the emergence of a new efficiency-seeking strategy which 
is likely to develop in the years to come with the current rise of unit labour cost in 
China. 
 
Table 10 - The biggest 50 Chinese multinationals ranked by foreign assets, 2010 
Rank Company Rank Company 
1 China Unicom Corporation 26 China Huneng Group 
2 China National Petroleum (CNPC) 27 
China Communication Construction Co, 
Ltd 
3 China Petrochemical Corporation 28 China Vanke Co, Ltd 
4 China Resources (Holdings) Co, Ltd 29 China Metallurgical Group 
5 China National Offshore Oil (CNOOC) 30 Yanzhou Coal Mining Company Ltd 
6 China Merchants Group 31 
SINOTRANS Changjiang Nl Shipping 
Corp. 
7 China State Construction Engineering Co 32 State Grid Corporation of China 
8 
China Ocean Shipping Company 
(COSCO) 
33 
China North Industries Group 
Corporation 
9 Sinochem Corporation 34 Guangzhou Yuexiu Holdings Limited 
10 
China Mobile Commiunications 
Corporation 
35 China Guandong Nuclear Power Holding 
11 Huawei Technologies Co, Ltd 36 China Ship Buiding Industry Corporation 
12 Aluminum Corporation of China 37 ZTE Corporation 
13 
China National Cereals, Oils & 
Foodstuffs 
38 Shougang Corporation 
14 China Power Investment Corporation 39 China National Chemical Corporation 
15 Legend Holdings Ltd 40 Yantai Xinyi Investment Ltd 
16 Geely Holding Group 41 Shanghai Baosteel Group Corporation 
17 China Minmetals Corporation 42 
Changsha Zoomlion HI S&T 
Development 
18 CITIC Group 43 Shum Yip Holdings Company Ltd 
19 China Poly Group Corporation 44 
China Non Ferrous Metal Mining & 
Constr. 
20 Beijing Enterprises Group Company Ltd 45 SINOHYDRO Co, Ltd 
21 Hunan Valin Iron & Steel Co, Ltd 46 Jiangsu Shagang Group 
22 China Shipping Company 47 
China International Marien Containers 
Ltd 
23 China National Aviation Holding Corp. 48 Wuhan Iron & Steel Corporation 
24 GDH Limited 49 China National Gold Group Corporation 
25 SinoSteel Corporation 50 Jinchuan Group Ltd 
Source: MOFCOM Statistical Bulletin. 
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Table 11 - A sample of significant trans-border mergers-acquisitions achieved by Chinese companies, 
2004-2011 
Buyer 
Acquired company or 





CNOOC (1) Unocal Oil 18500 
Chinalco Rio Tinto (12%) Mining 14280 
Sinopec Addax Petroleum (Swizt.) Oil 7200 
Sinopec Repsol, Brazil (40%) Oil 7100 
China Investment Corp Morgan Stanley (9.9%) Banking 5000 
Sinopec 
Conoco Phillip, Canada 
(9%) 
Oil 4650 
COSL Awilco Offshore Drilling 3890 
Huaneng Power Tuas Power (Singapore) Power 3070 
Sinopec Udmurneft Oil 3500 
CNPC PetroKazzakhstan Oil 3960 
CNOOC Bridas (Argentina) Oil 3100 
Sinochem 
Peregrino field (Brazil) 
40% 
Oil 3070 
China Investment Corp Blackstone Group L.P. Private equity 3000 
Yanzhou Coal Felix Resources (Australia) Coal 2950 






Pan American, Argentina 
30% 
Oil 2470 
Sinopec Occidental (Argentina) Oil 2450 
CNOOC South Atlantic Petroleum Oil 2268 
CNOOC 
Chesapeake Energy, US 
(33%) 
Oil 2200 
Investor Group Kazakhstan Energy 1874 
Geely Volvo Automobile 1500 
Lenovo Group IBM PC Business Computers 1760 
CNPC 
National Iranian Oil 
Company 
Oil 1760 
CNPC Athabasca Oil Sands Oil 1740 
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Buyer 
Acquired company or 





Wanhua Polyurethanes Borsodchem (Hungary) Chemicals 1701 
China Investment Corp Lexington Partners (USA) Finance 1500 





CNPC Canadian Energy Oil 1420 
Minmetals Oz Minerals Mining 1350 
Sinosteel Midwest (Australia) Iron 1300 
Haier America Trading Maytag Corp Appliances 1280 
CNPC Mynamar Oil & Gas Construction 1280 
Huaneng Power IntrerGen, US (50%) Power 1230 
China Investment Corp Penn West, Canada (5%) Oil 1220 
Xingxing Iron & 
Minmetals 
Kelachandra & Manasara Steel 1200 
Bosai Minerals Ghana Minerals  Aluminium 1200 





CITIC Securities  Bear Stearns (9.9%) Banking 1000 
State Grid 
Cobra Elecnor & Isolux, 
Brazil 
Power 990 
China Investment Corp Apax Finance Finance 960 
Sinochem Emeral Energy Energy 880 
Hunan Valin Iron & 
Steel 
Fortescue Metals (16.5%) Iron 770 
Sinopec Chevron Indonesia Gas 680 
Hudian Sintez (Russia) (51%) Gas 650 
China Investment Corp 
Goldman Sachs distress 
fund 
Finance 600 
Sinopec AED (Australia) (60%) Oil 560 
China Merchants Group Loscam Shipping 550 
China Investment Corp Blackrock Finance 530 
China Metallurgical Palmer’s Mineralogy Coal 520 
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Buyer 
Acquired company or 






Shanghai Automobile Ssangyong Motors Automobile 509 
Sinochem Soco (Yemen) Oil 470 





Wuhan Iron & Steel 
MMX Mineracao, Brazil 
22% 
Iron 400 
Guandong Rising Asset Caledon (Australia) Coal 400 





Chalco  GIIG (Malaysia) Aluminium 350 
China Int. Marine 
Containers 
Yantai Raffles Shipyard Shipping 330 
Shanghai Automobile GM India (50%) Automobile 330 
China Minsheng UCBH Holdings (10%) Banking 317 
China Investment Corp Nobel Holdings (Russia) Oil 300 
Tencent Digital Sky, Russia (10%) Technology 300 
Jiangsu Shagang Bulk Minerals & Grange Iron 270 








China Investment Corp 







Jinchuan Group Wesizwe Platinu Mining 230 




Medical devices 202 
CNPC Pluspetrol Norte Oil 200 
Hanlong Mining Moly Mines Iron 200 
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Buyer 
Acquired company or 





BAIC Saab Automobile 200 
Baiyin, CITIC & Chang 
Xin 
Oxus (Uzbekistan) Mining 190 
Ningbo Qingchun 
Clothing 




Peninsular & Oriental 
Steam 
Shipping 181 
 Navigation   
Three Gorges EuroSibEnergo (Russia) Power 170 
China Merchants Group Ming Wah Universal  Transportation 168 
CNPC Turkmenistan Motor, transport 167 
Sinopec First International Oil Oil 160 
WuXi PharmaTech AppTec Laboratory Biopharmaceuticals 151 
Great Wall Motor Litex Motors (Bulgaria) Automobile 120 
China Investment Corp GDF Suez (30%) Electric services n.a.  
(1) Eventually failed due to national security issues. 
(2) Failed due to political objections and national security reasons. 
Source: adapted from H. Rui, G.S. Yip & S. Prashantham (2010) and Salidjanova (2011). 
 
The M&A mode of Chinese MNCs’ entry suddenly took off after 2000 targeting 
both developed and developing countries (Table 11). In 2004, a circular issued by the 
National Development Research Council (NDRC) and the Export-Import Bank of 
China explicitly promoted trans-border M&As. Renminbi appreciation against the US 
dollar and Euro in the recent years has reduced the cost of Chinese M&As over 
Western companies. From 2000 to 2010, Chinese MNCs merged or acquired 83 
companies located in EU countries (Clegg and Voss, 2012). But between 2007 and 2009, 
the total number of Chinese overseas M&As plummeted from 243 to 82; the total trans-
border M&A value fell from $32.8 billion to $1.4 billion. Most overseas M&As achieved 
between 2008 and 2010 failed and translated into a fall in the stock value of those 
companies involved. Thus, in presence of very high country risk, Chinese MNCs prefer 
greenfield investment. When a host country has stronger national innovation ability or 
higher level of human capital, Chinese firms tend to choose M&As. An increase in the 
cultural distance appears to induce Chinese MNCs to select M&As as well (Hu et al., 
2012). The number and magnitude of trans-border M&A deals by Chinese MNCs on 
average are much bigger than those observed with other BRICs’ MNCs, except the giant 
Mittal-Arcelor deal. 
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4. Geographical orientation of BRICs’ outward foreign direct investment 
Tax havens such as Cyprus, Hong Kong, Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Channel 
Islands, Bahamas, Gibraltar, Macau, and St Vincent & Grenadines are highly ranked 
among the major host countries of BRICs’ OFDI as well as tax-friendly developed 
countries like Luxembourg, Switzerland, the Netherlands, and Austria (Table 12). Most 
of them, like Cyprus, are well-known rocket pads for round tripping circular investment. 
A part of OFDI in tax havens consists in round tripping FDI, i.e. for instance 
investment by Russian enterprises and citizens in offshore companies, in particular in 
Cyprus and the Virgin Islands, in view of reinvesting the corresponding capital later on 
in Russia11. A significant share of Chinese OFDI consists in round tripping as well, since 
75% of overall stock in 2010 is invested in tax havens12, which is a much higher share 
than with Russian OFDI. It is what most of Chinese OFDI in Hong Kong, Macau, the 
Virgin and Cayman Islands is all about. 
Top host countries of Brazilian OFDI are Caribbean tax havens and tax-friendly 
developed countries. FDI outflows to tax havens often flow back to Brazil, mainly in 
the form of intra-company transfers: 91% of annual cross-border intra-company 
transfers of Brazilian MNCs were with tax havens in 2008. However this sort of round 
tripping seems to be less widespread than in the case of Russian and Chinese OFDI. 
Fiscal regulation in Brazil seemingly induces investment in tax havens to escape 
regulatory and tax obligations. This suggests that Brazilian MNCs undertake trans-
shipping FDI in tax-haven countries while waiting for good opportunities to make 
productive investment in third countries. This behaviour is different from that of 
Chinese MNCs that tend to be involved in round tripping OFDI due to favorable 
conditions offered by Chinese government to foreign investors in mainland China. The 
share of round tripping via tax havens in Indian OFDI must be lower than in the three 
other BRICs though the great bulk of OFDI channeled from India to countries such as 
Mauritius, Cyprus and Virgin Islands is ultimately geared toward third countries. 
 
 
                                                 
11 Since the 2008-on crisis round tripping and trans-shipping OFDI received in offshore economies 
has accelerated again to reach up to two-thirds of Russian OFDI. Its final destination is the CIS, 
CEECs and primarily the Russian Federation herself. 
12 Indeed, only a part of Chinese OFDI transiting through tax havens namely Hong Kong, are round 
tripping flows. There is no official assessment of round tripping OFDI published by the MOFCOM. 
Western experts of China and press articles assess that it may be up to 50% of OFDI to Hong Kong.  
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Table 12 - Major host countries of BRICs’ OFDI stock 
Brazilian OFDI 2012 $mn % Russian OFDI 2011 $mn % 
Austria 56618 22.9 Cyprus 121596 33.6 
Cayman Islands 40264 16.3 Netherlands 57291 15.8 
Netherlands 28186 11.4 Virgin islands 46137 12.8 
Virgin Islands 22291 9.0 Switzerland 12679 3.5 
United States 18401 7.4 Luxembourg 11599 3.2 
Spain 15376 6.2 United Kingdom 10662 2.9 
Luxembourg 14719 6.0 United States 9501 2.6 
Bahamas 14500 5.9 Jersey 7035 1.9 
Argentina 5511 2.2 Germany 6692 1.8 
Hungary 3207 1.3 Gibraltar 5701 1.6 
Peru 2986 1.2 Bahamas 5481 1.5 
Uruguay 2951 1.2 Belarus 4663 1.3 
Panama 2430 1.0 St Vincent Grenad. 4421 1.2 
Portugal 2139 0.9 Ukraine 4395 1.2 
Canada 1804 0.7 Austria 4229 1.2 
 
Indian OFDI 2009* $bn % Chinese OFDI 2010 $mn % 
Singapore 14.2 20.8 Hong Kong 199056 62.8 
Netherlands 10.6 15.4 Virgin Islands 23243 7.3 
Mauritius 5.6 8.1 Cayman Islands 17256 5.4 
Channel Islands 5.4 7.9 Australia 7868 2.4 
United Kingdom 5.2 7.6 Singapore 6069 1.9 
United States 5.1 7.4 Luxembourg 5787 1.8 
Cyprus 4.7 6.8 USA 4874 1.5 
United Arab Emirates 2.1 3.1 South Africa 4153 1.3 
Russia 1.4 2.0 Russia 2788 0.9 
Sudan 1.2 1.7 Canada 2603 0.8 
Switzerland 1.1 1.6 Macau 2229 0.7 
China 0.9 1.3 Myanmar 1947 0.6 
Virgin Islands 0.9 1.2 Pakistan 1828 0.6 
Egypt 0.8 1.2 Kazakhstan 1591 0.5 
Denmark 0.8 1.2 Germany 1502 0.5 
* Cumulative stock of outward investment approvals, 2002-2009 
Sources: Banco Central do Brazil, Central Bank of Russia, Reserve Bank of India and MOFCOM Statistical Bulletin. 
 
A next destination of BRICs OFDI encompass developed countries and major 
export markets, like the Netherlands, the UK, Germany, Austria, Turkey, Spain, 
Bulgaria, France for Russian OFDI. Western advanced economies are important hosts 
of Chinese OFDI as well, first of all Australia and the US (the Pacific Rim). As other 
BRICs’ MNCs, in the past decade Brazilian firms have re-oriented their investment 
abroad toward Europe (44.7% of total in 2012) which is now their major host area. 
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Developed countries started enhancing their position since the 1990s and had overtaken 
developing countries in 2000-2007 as the most attractive host region for Indian OFDI. In the 
1990s and 2000s Indian OFDI shifted toward M&As in developed countries (Kumar, 
2007). In fact, since 2000, Indian MNCs have used overseas M&As as the main mode of 
entry into developed countries as against greenfield investment into developing ones. 
Indian MNCs continue to invest in developed-country based companies, particularly 
now that they are more affordable due to global crisis. The rise of host developed 
countries is also due to the adoption of overseas acquisitions by a large number of 
Indian MNCs to access foreign technologies and knowledge mostly concentrated in 
innovation driven developed region. Improved attractiveness of developed countries to 
Indian OFDI is also rooted in the rise of service firms like software, communication, 
etc., as India’s global players mostly focused on service-dominated developed countries. 
A third geographical orientation of BRICs OFDI – which had originally been the 
most attractive one – is toward neighbouring countries. In the 1990s, Russian OFDI 
was first geared towards the close abroad, i.e. the CIS independent member states, as a 
legacy from the past. Various studies confirmed a still significant involvement of 
Russian FDI in Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine (Yeremeyeva, 2009; Blyakha, 2009). 
The next most important host countries were CEECs as former CMEA members in 
which, like in the CIS, Russian companies enjoyed familiarity with local business 
conditions. Future new EU members, in a short lapse of time, took place among the 
most significant host countries for Russian OFDI. Such geographical distribution was 
specific to the first decade of Russian companies’ expansion abroad. Now, more non-
European countries appear among the major host areas for Russian MNCs settlement, 
namely the U.S., Canada, the United Arab Emirates, and India. 
Since 2005, Russian MNCs have made noticeable acquisitions in developing 
countries focused on Asia and Africa. Russian MNCs are somewhat losing their 
specificity as companies supposed to achieve most of their OFDI on an intra-regional 
base in countries located in the same region of the world as their home country. The 
only exception so far is Latin America – with no one of the first 30 host countries for 
Russian OFDI that belongs to – due to its remote location and institutional barriers 
such as absent bilateral non double taxation and investment treaties with Russia. 
Some major host countries for Chinese OFDI are located in neighbouring South 
East Asia and East Asia, i.e. 15 among the first 36 host countries. Hence, Chinese 
MNCs, like Russian ones, are lean to privilege a close geographical area as well as 
developed market economies. However, they have already significantly spread in some 
African (South Africa, Nigeria, Zambia, Congo DR) and Latin American (Brazil, Peru) 
countries. At the end of the day, geographical distribution of China’s OFDI is more 
diversified than the Russia’s; first Russian OFDI in Latin America and Africa has 
emerged only recently. 
Chinese MNCs invest in transition economies though the latter’s share in Chinese 
OFDI is small (3% of 2010 overall stock) but its growth rate is fast, concentrated in the 
CIS and Mongolia (Korniyenko and Sakatsume, 2009), with an increased interest in 
Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan). However, the focus in this area is definitely 
on Russia, ranked the 9th host country of Chinese OFDI, and the 5th one after Australia, 
Singapore, the US and South Africa when excluding offshore destinations and Hong 
Kong. For instance, Hisense owns a sales base in Russia and a production centre in 
Hungary, TCL disposes of factories in Russia and Poland. Chery Automobile invested in 
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an assembly line in Russia in 2006. Geely holds a joint production plant in Russia and 
sales companies in Ukraine. In the textile industry, there are many Chinese investments 
in Mongolia. CNOOC is a major shareholder in the Kazakhstan North Caspian 
Operations Company. Thus, Chinese MNCs harshly compete with Russian MNCs since 
the mid-2000s in the latter’s privileged areas for OFDI: Central Asia, other CIS 
countries and to some extent CEECs. A deep asymmetry lies in there: China 
significantly invests in Russia whereas the reverse investment from Russia into China is 
much less impressive. Chinese investors are much visible in Russia east of the Urals 
whereas Russian investors are nearly invisible in most Chinese provinces. 
Brazil’s OFDI former concentration in the Americas has somewhat changed with 
expansion in Europe. High regional concentration, particularly in North America, Latin 
America and the Caribbean, which together accounted for 79% of all Brazil’s OFDI 
stock between 2001 and 2008, now belongs to the past. Among the first 32 host 
countries of Brazilian OFDI, just one developing country shows up that is Angola, a 
Portuguese-speaking country. Mozambique is further down the list. Overall Brazilian 
MNCs are neither attracted in less developed countries by their markets nor by their 
unit labour cost so far; when they invest in such countries this is basically for securing 
natural resources. 
The share of developing countries in early OFDI from India increased all over the 1970s 
to attain its highest share ever: 96%. Then, Indian OFDI into Africa declined mainly because of 
growing policy restrictions on inward FDI, political violence and internal strife in African 
countries. The attraction of developing regions to Indian OFDI continued to be very high until 
1999 though reoriented toward Asia. Over 1961-2007, a total of 1,674 Indian parent companies 
invested in as many as 92 developing countries. A last wave was led by Indian 
pharmaceutical MNCs that started up locating direct investment in Latin American 
countries, in particular Brazil, since 1999 (Sweet, 2010). Geographical pattern of Indian 
OFDI in developing countries has shown trends of spatial diversification in 2000-2007, the host 
Asia-Oceania region received about 39% of Indian OFDI, followed by Africa with 34%, South-
East Europe and the CIS with 15% and Latin America and Caribbean with 13%. Since the 
2000s, geographical distribution of Indian OFDI is a mix between neighbouring 
countries, major developed countries and tax havens. Such a distribution is rather 
similar to the one observed with other BRICs’ OFDI. Singapore is now the largest hosts 
to Indian OFDI since the two countries have signed a Comprehensive Economic 
Cooperation Agreement in 200513. 
5. Industrial distribution of BRICs’ outward foreign direct investment 
Since the industrial classifications used by central banks for publishing OFDI data 
are not identical at a disaggregated level across the BRICs14, a comparison of industrial 
distribution of their OFDI can only be conducted in rather broad terms. 
Industrial distribution of Russian OFDI is specific when compared to other 
BRICs’ OFDI. Not only it is concentrated on a few industries, like in other BRICs, but 
Russian MNCs are overrepresented in natural resource exploitation, mining and 
                                                 
13 In the 1990s, Russia dominated as a host of Indian OFDI, largely due to a rupee-rouble agreement 
which enabled Indian MNCs to conduct Russian trade and investment in rupees. 
14 The Central Bank of Russia has not published regularly a breakdown of OFDI by industry so far, and 
one is compelled to refer to the common knowledge about Russian MNCs’ industrial activity. 
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metallurgical industries, then in traditional manufacturing industries, all inherited from 
the top pecking order of heavy industries in the former Soviet system. Cases in point are 
Gazprom, Lukoil, Itera, Tatneft, Novatek in the hydrocarbons industry; Severstal, 
Evraz, Norilsk Nickel, Alrosa, Basic Element (which owns Rusal), NMLK, Mechel, 
TMK, Koks, Metalloinvest, MMK, and Novolipetsk Steel in the metallurgical industry; 
Inter RAO UES in electricity production; Renova, OMZ and Borodino in machinery; 
AvtoVAZ, GAZ, UAZ and KAMAZ in the automotive industry; and in various 
industries, Investlesprom (paper-wood), Eurocement and LSR Group (building 
materials), Eurochem (chemical fertilizers), Acron (agro-chemistry), WimmBillDann, 
Russian Solod, SGI Group, Alterwest and Russian Wine Trust (agro-food industry). 
However, Russian OFDI started booming in the 2000s in more modernised parts 
of the manufacturing industry with Sistema group (which owns MTS) in telephone 
production, Sitronics in telecom equipment, Vimpelcom, Altimo, Megafon and Alfa 
Group in telecom, Korolev Rocket and Space Corporation Energia in aeronautics, RTI 
Systems in aerospace and missile production, NPO Mashinostroyenia in military 
equipment. Big Russian insurance and financial companies and big banks have 
developed and internationalised in the formerly underdeveloped (Soviet) services 
industry such as Sberbank, VTB, Gazprombank, Alfa-bank and Bank of Moscow. Such 
MNCs exemplify a more recent industrial diversification of Russian OFDI which 
spreads over high tech and services industries resulting from a partial modernisation of 
the Russian industry which was launched at the dawn of the post-Soviet transition and 
became more deeply rooted after 1999. 
The most striking feature in the industrial structure of Chinese OFDI is the high 
share of services. If one adds banking and trade to other services, the share of the 
tertiary sector is up to about 60% of overall OFDI (Table 13), which resembles the 
industrial distribution of OFDI from developed countries. Investing abroad in the 
tertiary sector is typical of the global strategy conducted by major Western MNCs 
(Andreff, 2003b). Chinese MNCs are about to stick to such strategy and likely to be 
ahead of Russian MNCs in this respect, none of the latter being known as a leader in the 
global services industry so far. A resource seeking strategy of Chinese MNCs is at work 
in mining. However, it is far from the overwhelming share of mining, oil and gas in 
Russian OFDI. With a noticeable difference: while Russian MNCs invest abroad 
looking for both new supply sources and new markets (oil and gas stations), Chinese 
strategy is almost exclusively geared towards securing a supply of raw materials for the 
domestic economy. Chinese MNCs look for securing their supply in natural resources 
all around the world: in Australia, Russia and Canada, but increasingly in Latin America, 
Central Asia, and Africa. Chinese OFDI in the manufacturing industry is less significant 
than in mining and its share has decreased in total from 2004 to 2010. 
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Table 13 - Industrial distribution of BRICs outward FDI stock (in %) 
Brazil India* China 
Industry  
2004 2010 2003 2010 2004 2010 
Primary sector, of which: 1.9 31.2 4.3 8.3 15.2 14.9 
Mining and quarrying 0.4 27.4        
Petroleum and gas 1.0 3.7        
Agriculture, forestry, fishing 0.5 1.1    1.9 0.8 
Mining        13.3 14.1 
Secondary sector, of which: 3.4 9.4 71.8 29.9 25.1 18.6 
Food, beverage & tobacco 0.4 3.3        
Non metallic products 0.1 2.3        
Metallurgy 0.05 2.0        
Manufacturing       10.1 5.6 
Construction, real estate, 
infrastructures 
      4.8 5.7 
Transportation, storage       10.2 7.3 
Tertiary sector, of which: 94.7 59.3 23.9 61.8 59.7 66.5 
Finance and insurance 51.9 38.3        
Services to companies 37.1 10.5        
Finance, banking    0.1 38.8 0 17.4 
Trade    4.7 11.2 17.5 13.2 
Other services     19.0 11.8 42.2 35.9 
* FDI outflows 
Sources: Banco Central do Brazil; UNCTAD and Reserve Bank of India; and MOFCOM Statistical Bulletin for 
China. 
 
Brazilian MNCs primarily expanded abroad in the tertiary sector – over 88% of all 
OFDI until 2007, which compares with Chinese OFDI concentration in the services 
industry. Crisis has affected this industrial distribution: the share of the tertiary sector 
fell down to 59% while the share of the primary sector grew from 2-3% up to 31%. 
Above-listed trans-border M&As were many in the primary sector for securing natural 
resource supply in times of crisis. The manufacturing industry still remains minor in 
Brazilian OFDI which explains that efficiency seeking relocation of production in view 
of lowering unit labour costs has not emerged yet. A significant share of OFDI in 
resource-based industries and quite few manufacturing investments abroad reveal 
comparative advantages of a home country well-endowed in natural resources that 
Brazil shares to some extent with Russia (Andreff, 2015). 
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Overall, industrial distribution of Indian OFDI reflects a change from essentially 
market seeking to more asset seeking strategy (Kumar, 2007). Until 1990, Indian OFDI 
concentrated in the manufacturing industry, in particular pharmaceuticals and chemicals. 
There was a first shift from manufacturing to services in the 1980s. Inefficiencies and 
low productivity due to inward looking policies led to a slowdown in OFDI from Indian 
manufacturing industry while the faster growing services sector in the national economy 
increased its share in OFDI. In the pre-1991 period market seeking OFDI developed on 
the basis of Indian firms’ intermediate technology in relatively low tech industries such 
as light engineering (Lall, 1986). The main technological advantage that Indian MNCs 
achieved through absorbing, assimilating, adapting and reverse engineering of foreign tech-
nologies offered limited scope for exploitation in developed countries. Those modified foreign 
technologies to suit local demand and factor conditions rather provided Indian MNCs certain 
competitive advantages in other developing countries having similar economic conditions to 
India’s. 
Since 1991, about 60% of Indian OFDI concentrated in IT, communication, 
software and media, trade, banking and finance. Within the manufacturing industry, 
power generation, electronic equipment, telecom, chemicals, pharmaceuticals and 
software development were among the predominant investors abroad. Knowledge-
based industries - software and IT, depository institutions, professional, technical and 
scientific services – have heavily invested abroad since 2000. This maturing technologi-
cal strength of large-sized Indian MNCs is now allowing them to exploit their 
competitive advantages even in developed countries. Consequently, in the 2000s, 
manufacturing has displaced services as the principal OFDI industry, and the primary 
sector’s share is now growing quickly. While pharmaceuticals, consumer electronics and 
automotive accounted for the bulk of manufacturing OFDI in the first half of the 
decade, the second half has seen a concentration in metals, energy and natural resource 
investments, and increasing activity by consumer goods and food and beverage MNCs. 
In the aftermath of global economic crisis, Indian FDI outflows15 shifted again toward 
services since 2010. While IT initially dominated services OFDI, investment in other 
services industries, such as financial and insurance services, entertainment and 
broadcasting, construction, and telecom, is now mounting. 
6. The determinants of BRICs’ outward foreign direct investment 
Economic determinants of a country’s OFDI are usually studied relying on 
econometric testing of their statistical significance as in Andreff (2003a). In this section 
is collected a sample of recent econometric studies (none of my own) that attempt to 
specify which variables are explanatory of OFDI respectively from Brazil, Russia, India 
and China. However, the surveyed econometric studies are classified here in an 
analytical framework that distinguishes FDI pull factors from push factors (Andreff, 
2015). Pull factors are much in tune with IDP model (Dunning, 1981); they attract and 
drive inward FDI into a given country, otherwise coined host country’s factors of 
attractiveness to FDI (Andreff, 1999a). They differentiate host countries. Thus, when 
analysing OFDI, the explanatory power of pull factors is basically to point out which 
                                                 
15 Since Indian data about OFDI are basically published in terms of flows, they are more fluctuating than 
in other BRICs which publish OFDI stock; consequently, industrial distribution of OFDI flows (India) 
appears to be more fluctuating than the one of OFDI stock in other BRICs.  
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host countries do attract foreign investment flowing from any home country. Pull 
factors definitely are determinants of the geographical distribution between host 
countries of OFDI from (a given set of) home countries. They determine an outward 
investor’s trade-off between host countries, therefore a MNC choice to invest in one 
host country rather than another one on the basis of their attractiveness variables 
(Michalet 1997; Andreff 1999b). 
Push factors usually are referred to as home country-specific. They are drivers for 
a home country substituting investment abroad to domestic investment; they explain 
why investment is pushed outwards domestic borders. They are embedded in the home 
country’s economy, in particular all factors that may depend on domestic industries and 
markets a company is involved in. Therefore, push factors are related to domestic 
industrial structure and are drivers of OFDI industrial distribution abroad. Push factors 
such as domestic market size (population as a proxy), economic development (GDP per 
capita), technological level, industrial distribution of value added across different 
industries have been successfully tested (Andreff, 2003a) as underlying the IDP model, 
at least in initial stages of OFDI development. 
Starting with Brazil, it is the only BRIC for which recent econometric testing has 
retained push factors as explanatory variables of OFDI (Carvalho, 2009). However 
Ellström and Engblad (2009) have found that though the shape of Brazilian IDP 
correlates with the conceptual IDP model, the underlying factors causing the shifts in 
net outward investment are not due to development of the country´s OLI-advantages16. 
OFDI was initially caused by economic reforms and later by global business cycles as in 
many late outward investor countries such as Brazil: IDP theory explains the 
development of Brazil’s OFDI only to a limited extent. Indeed, in a further maturing 
stage of IDP model, pull factors have been tested as major explanatory variables for all 
BRICs’ OFDI (Appendix 1). 
Four important factors pushed Brazilian firms to become new MNCs (Fleury and 
Fleury, 2009): privatisation; consolidation of the domestic consumer goods industry; 
denationalisation of the durable goods industry; and the creation of Mercosur. Concer et 
al. (2010) assess the common wisdom prevailing in Brazil that accounts for exchange 
rate variations as a significant push factor. Their results stress that although strong 
exchange rate is often blamed in Brazil for forcing companies to invest abroad, the 
evidence found in the aggregate data suggests that there is not that significant 
relationship between the level of foreign exchange rate and Brazilian OFDI. 
Relying on host country data, Amal and Tomio (2012) estimate a model for 
Brazilian OFDI over eight years (2002-09) and 22 host countries data. Brazilian OFDI is 
positively related to host country’s economic performance, its market size assessed by 
GDP (the higher a host country’s GDP, the higher Brazilian OFDI into this country), 
macroeconomic stability (inflation, real exchange rate), and trade openness. GDP is 
statistically significant at a 1% threshold, meaning that Brazilian MNCs invest more in 
large economies, providing support to the market seeking hypothesis. Brazilian MNCs 
                                                 
16 A firm’s OFDI is a strategic response to its (O) ownership specific or competitive advantages, to the 
(L) locational advantages of host countries, and to (I) the opportunities open to internalize its O 
advantages between the home and selected host countries, with reference to the eclectic paradigm of 
international production (Dunning, 1988).  
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are more likely oriented to invest in host markets with a growing demand and a higher 
level of economic openness, measured by a proxy of trade flows between the home and 
host countries. A negative relation between OFDI and real exchange rate means that the 
more the real is overvalued, the higher OFDI. Since GDP per inhabitant is not 
significant, Brazilian OFDI is not basically attracted to the most developed countries 
and spreads to less developed countries as well. 
The above model also includes cultural distance as an explanatory variable. Cyrino 
et al. (2010) go further in considering psychic distance as a major determinant of 
Brazilian companies’ OFDI referring to Vahlne and Wiedersheim-Paul (1973). Psychic 
distance is a broad concept encompassing different administrative, economic and legal 
systems, as well as language and religious differences. The path of Brazilian OFDI is 
coherent with the gradualist perspective of the behavioural approach to 
internationalisation which states that companies choose to enter countries considering 
their psychic distance in order to accumulate experience in those markets before 
entering successively more distant countries, in line with the Uppsala school (Johanson 
and Vahlne, 1990). Amal and Tomio (2012) check a high correlation between cultural 
and geographical distance on the one hand and, on the other hand, institutional 
indicators meaning that a positive institutional environment in host country affects 
positively Brazilian MNCs’ investment strategy. This suggests that Brazilian MNCs are 
more involved in host countries exhibiting an improved institutional environment in 
terms of business climate, political stability, law enforcement, and government 
effectiveness. 
When it comes to Russia the IDP model - though successfully tested for 
transition countries (Andreff, 2003a) - does not entirely account for the whole 
specificity of Russian MNCs any longer. It is contented that Russian OFDI is not 
actually verifying this model (Kalotay, 2008b) because it started up as a form of capital 
flight linked to bad domestic investment climate until 1998 – however it is a push factor. 
Moreover, a number of companies became MNCs overnight with the break-up of the 
former Soviet Union whereas those assets grabbed by a handful of powerful oligarchs in 
the privatisation drive had rapidly evolved into MNCs. Besides, some Russian MNCs 
compare to MNCs based in developed countries (Kuznetsov, 2010), as if Russia already 
was on the brink of reaching the fourth step of IDP model. 
Kalotay and Sulstarova (2010) econometric testing relies only on data about trans-
border M&As involving Russian firms which is indeed a major part of Russia’s overall 
OFDI. Market size is the most significant explanatory variable: Russian MNCs first 
invest abroad to capture foreign markets. Then they invest abroad to secure their supply 
of natural resources. The share of the tertiary sector in the host economy, distance from 
Russia, exchange rate, and cultural proximity are not significant determinants. Such 
modelling has two limitations: it does not check the determinants of Russian greenfield 
investment abroad and, more basically, it does not introduce a dummy variable for the 
influence of Russian government17 on strategies conducted by Russian MNCs or any 
other push factor. 
                                                 
17 Kalotay and Sulstarova (2010) take into account a change in the government policy with simply 
distinguishing the period when B. Yeltsin was the President of the Russian Federation from the one 
when V. Putin stepped in. Kalotay (2008b) stresses an increasing role of the government in controlling 
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With regards to India, an exhaustive survey of its OFDI determinants would have 
gone beyond the scope of this paper since it is the most studied country among the 
BRICs in this respect. Determinants that are looked for are pull factors. Anwar et al. 
(2008) test a significant relationship between Indian OFDI and host country’s real GDP 
(positive and significant at a 5% threshold). Real exchange rate of the host country’s 
currency is positively but not significantly related to Indian OFDI: it cannot be 
concluded that Indian MNCs invest in those countries with stronger or weaker 
currencies. The coefficient of distance to the host country’s capital city is negative and 
significant: the further a country from New Dehli the lower Indian OFDI, which 
explains the latter’s location primarily in neighbouring countries. The real GDP deflator 
in host country is positively related to Indian OFDI: Indian MNCs are attracted in 
rather inflationary countries. 
Anwar and Mughal (2012) test whether economic freedom in host countries has a 
positive impact on attracting Indian OFDI: the relationship is found highly significant 
(at a 1% threshold) for all regions except Europe and the group of OECD countries 
(only significant at 5 %), and statistically non-significant for North America. The latter 
result may be due to the small number of observations for this region. Indian OFDI to 
all regions is strongly influenced by a prior experience of Indian investment in the 
region indicating that it is driven by prior knowledge of these markets (market seeking). 
The relationship with linguistic affinity is positive. Other results are that government 
size, tax incentives, ease of trade, credit regulation, access to sound money and business 
regulations are determinants of Indian OFDI whereas the security of property rights 
and inflation are less important drivers. 
A gravity model is applied by Hattari and Rajan (2008) to a panel of annual data 
for 57 home and 57 host countries between 2000 and 2005 with a dummy variable for 
India. The outcome of econometric testing is that distance is statistically significant. A 
greater distance between home and host countries lowers OFDI flows. Physical distance 
may be a proxy for transaction costs, time zone differences and/or information gaps. 
Larger host countries experience more FDI inflows from India. OFDI flows to host 
countries with higher R&D spending as a share of GDP and with abundant natural 
resource endowment and where stock market capitalisation is significant. With regards 
to Indian OFDI three findings are noticeable. First, real exchange rate appears 
statistically significant – a rise in host country’s real exchange rate vis-à-vis the rupee 
reduces OFDI from India. Second, there is evidence that Indian OFDI is relatively 
more market seeking and somewhat less R&D seeking than OFDI from other Asian 
countries. Third, Indian MNCs appear to be as much resource seeking as MNCs from 
Asian countries. 
In a further work, Hattari and Rajan (2010) test another specification of the 
gravity model where a binary variable is equal to one if two economies share a common 
official language, another binary variable is equal to one if two economies have a past 
colonial relationship; and a variable stands for the unobservable type of home country 
effects. Econometric results are basically the same: distance, a common official 
language, a past colonial relationship, bilateral real exchange rate, R&D spending, 
                                                                                                                                      
those companies exploiting natural resources as the most specific factor that impeded applying all the 
FDI explanatory theories to the analysis of Russian MNCs. 
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natural resource abundance, and stock market capitalisation are significant. In addition, 
a better pool of educated workers in host country is positive and significant, as well as a 
higher degree of trade openness and more intensive bilateral trade relations. However, 
the existence of a bilateral free-trade agreement is not statistically significant. With the 
India dummy, the gravity model variables (size and distance) remain highly robust, 
suggesting that drivers of OFDI by Indian MNCs are not that much different from their 
Asian counterparts. 
Nunnenkamp et al. (2012) find that market-related factors, rather than motives to 
access raw materials or superior technologies, have dominated location choices of 
Indian MNCs. India’s OFDI is assumed to be resilient to weak institutions and 
economic instability in host countries. The impact of independent variables on location 
choices proves to be weak for the overall sample. Most strikingly, no evidence is found 
for either horizontal or vertical FDI choices. Horizontal FDI should be reflected in 
significantly positive coefficients of size and growth in host country markets while 
vertical FDI should be reflected in significantly negative coefficients of average per-
capita income in host countries and significantly positive coefficients of their openness 
to trade. All these coefficients are statistically non-significant. 
Results are ambiguous with respect to the hypothesis that India’s OFDI should be 
resilient to political uncertainty, weak institutions and economic instability in host 
countries. A positive coefficient for inflation, suggesting that economically less stable 
host countries with higher inflation rates receive more FDI from India, supports this 
hypothesis; a positive coefficient for the Heritage Index of Economic Freedom is in 
conflict with the hypothesis. Better governance and institutions as reflected in higher 
values of the Heritage index attract more FDI from India18. Since the index ranges from 
one to 100, one point improvement in economic freedom leads to an increase in FDI 
flows by 0.19%. A dummy variable equal to one for English speaking host countries is 
not significant. However, the presence of an Indian Diaspora in host country is 
significantly positive19. Those variables introduced to capture vertical and asset seeking 
FDI suggest that both types of OFDI played a minor role during the period under 
consideration (1996-2009). No evidence is found that India’s OFDI is strongly 
motivated by access to raw materials in resource-rich host countries or access to 
superior technology in advanced host countries, or in host countries with lower per-
capita income. Market-related factors appear to have dominated location choices of 
Indian MNCs in the past. 
Finally turning to China, Buckley et al. (2008) have tested the determinants of 
Chinese OFDI with basically a pull factors model, the only push factor being the 
liberalisation of renminbi exchange rate. More variables about Chinese governmental 
policy toward OFDI are missing on the push factor side. Significant variables coming 
out from econometric testing are market size, WTO membership, and cultural 
proximity; all favour market seeking. The change in exchange rate policy is significant 
                                                 
18 An efficient governance system in host countries is tested as attracting higher Indian OFDI (Garcia-
Herrero and Deorukhkar, 2014). However, when controlling for Indian OFDI located in offshore 
financial centers, the host country’s ability to control corruption is not a significant determinant of 
Indian OFDI. 
19 That Diaspora plays a crucial role in augmenting Indian OFDI through facilitating acquisition and 
exchange of technical know-how, market information and physical capital is also tested significant and 
positive by Anwar and Mughal (2013).  
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but not with the expected sign: surprisingly, Chinese OFDI is negatively associated with 
liberalisation of foreign exchange controls. Probably OFDI should be determined by ‘go 
global’ measures (see below) but they are not tested. No significant relationship is found 
between Chinese OFDI and economic and institutional variables while paradoxically the 
model does not provide support to resource seeking and advanced technology and 
know-how asset seeking strategies by Chinese MNCs, no more than a gravity (distance) 
determination. The contention that Chinese MNCs are attracted - or less reluctant to 
invest - in highly risky countries (Buckley et al., 2007; Morck et al., 2007) is not 
confirmed20. The primary strategy of outward Chinese investors is market seeking 
whereas resource seeking strategy is empirically less crystal-clear than with Russian 
firms. 
In a comparable model, Rodriguez and Bustillo (2011) introduce a host country’s 
governance variable taken as an average of the six World Bank’s indicators for control 
of corruption, government effectiveness, political stability, regulation quality, rule of law, 
voice and accountability (Kaufmann et al., 2008 ). No significant relationship is found 
between governance and Chinese OFDI; strong governance in a host country neither 
attracts Chinese OFDI nor does low quality (thus risky) institutional framework hinder 
it. A resource seeking motive is found significant which fits better with actual strategies 
of Chinese MNCs observed at enterprise level. Poor institutions may well be linked to 
natural resource endowment because rent appropriation leads to rent-seeking, patronage 
and corruption. This is what Kolstad and Wiig (2009) had demonstrated beforehand, 
successfully testing the effect of interaction between natural resources and poor 
institutions on Chinese OFDI. In host countries with poor institutions natural resources 
attract Chinese OFDI. Finally, Fung and Garcia-Herrero (2012) find that Chinese OFDI 
is more attracted (than Indian OFDI) to more corrupt countries, but this result is mostly 
driven by Chinese investment in African countries. Chinese OFDI flows there into 
larger and poorer countries well-endowed with fuels. 
7. BRICs’ multinationals and home country state 
A study on BRICs-based MNCs (Holtbrügge and Kreppel, 2012) concludes that 
internationalisation of Brazilian and Indian companies is primarily driven by economic 
motives whereas Chinese and Russian firms receive substantial political support from 
their governments21 to invest abroad in strategically important industries. Is it so? 
                                                 
20 Due to risks involved in institutional uncertainty, barter and networking business, guanxi relationships 
based on informal norms, mutual trust, personal connections, ethnic linkages, corruption and the like in 
the Chinese post-communist transition, Chinese companies are often assumed to be more capable (than 
Western MNCs) to deal with troublesome regulation and opaque political constraints. They easily 
survive in comparably weak institutions in Central Asian and African host countries. Such experiences 
are even considered as an intangible asset of Chinese MNCs by Morck et al. To say the least, Russian 
MNCs started evolving at home in no less corrupted, networking and informal surroundings in a first 
stage of Russia’s economic transition, and they hold the same intangible asset. 
21 A focus on the governments’ national development strategies and OFDI in emerging economies is 
found in Gammeltoft and Kokko (2013).  
EJCE, vol.12, n.2 (2015) 
 
 
Available online at http://eaces.liuc.it 
114 
7.1 China Incorporated: state promotion of Chinese state-owned 
multinationals 
State intervention over Chinese OFDI relied on a high degree of regulation and 
control, a high number of state-owned MNCs, and the government quest for natural 
resources in short supply at home. The government formally pushes Chinese firms to go 
overseas by releasing motivating policies and providing support from the bureaucratic 
administration; informally it shapes their choices through propagating firm state 
ideology and national pride. Chinese government had adopted a ‘go global’ (zouchuqu) 
policy in 1999 which explicitly supported OFDI by Chinese companies; not only 
explicit, this support was eventually materialised in three fiats passed in 2004-05 which 
all promoted and regulated OFDI. 
Chinese OFDI is subject to multiple layers of hierarchical bureaucratic 
supervision and regulation. The first layer is the State Council which blueprints China’s 
overall OFDI in the long term. A second layer, the NDRC is responsible for putting 
forward OFDI strategies and plans. Guided by the NDRC strategic plan, the 
Department of Foreign Capital and Overseas Investment (a unit of NDRC) drafts a list 
of privileged industries for OFDI, examines and approves key projects. Then the 
Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) is responsible for conducting multilateral 
negotiations on foreign investment and trade treaties, and its Department of Outward 
Investment and Economic Cooperation drafts operational OFDI regulation and 
supervises non-financial enterprises’ OFDI. The Ministry of Finance provides financial 
support to OFDI through special funds. The State-owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission (SASAC) - in charge of reforming SOEs since 2003 so as 
to create profitable ‘national champions’ - manages and monitors state-owned assets in 
non-financial industries, including those invested abroad. A third layer consists in 
several other departments such as the State Administration of Foreign Exchange 
(SAFE) which surveys and approves the sources of funds, checks the legality of OFDI 
payments, manages overseas foreign exchange accounts, the China Development Bank, 
the Export-Import Bank of China and the China Export & Credit Insurance 
Corporation. Most Chinese OFDI are undertaken after state approval and with lax 
credits that fuel a soft budget constraint in state-owned MNCs. Province officials are 
involved: starting in 2003, SAFE and MOFCOM allowed OFDI of less than $3 million 
to be approved at provincial level. Thus, the state can act as the major player by 
explicitly and implicitly influencing firms’ decision making as regard OFDI. 
In 2003, the NDRC defined the content of key OFDI projects which included: a/ 
natural resource seeking in areas where China is in short supply; b/ investment in 
manufacturing that promotes export of technologies, products, and equipment; c/ R&D 
collaborative projects which could bring in advanced technologies, managerial 
experience and talents; d/ M&As to increase firms’ international competitiveness and 
spread their market. State control over international activities of Chinese MNCs has 
been relaxed partly as China’s WTO accession commitment and in response to 
increasing ‘marketisation’ of domestic economy (Sauvant, 2005). The government 
deregulated OFDI approval and foreign exchange control. Since 2006, it overtly 
conducted a ‘national champions’ policy fuelled with accumulated foreign exchange 
reserves, just like in Russia; and the promotion of actually global champions since 2010. 
A new regulatory framework in 2009 further eased and decentralised OFDI approval 
procedures, eased foreign exchange management for overseas projects, and broadened 
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the sources of finance available for OFDI. Since 2010, in the 12th Five-year Plan, an 
‘accelerating go-out’ strategy is pushed forward encouraging Chinese companies to 
invest abroad under policy guidance and with promised corporate autonomy. New rules 
for promoting OFDI with renminbi settlements were announced in 2011. 
The efforts of China’s big businesses to go global can be thought of as being part 
of a national power-building of China state capitalism’s globalisation strategy. Facilitated 
by extended protection from the state, reaching beyond China’s national boundaries, 
Chinese large SOEs raise investment capital and take risks that their foreign 
competitors, submitted to a hard budget constraint, cannot (Yao et al., 2010). Indeed, 
the great bulk of Chinese OFDI stock is held by state-owned MNCs: 160 of them 
currently managed by SASAC account for about 84% of overall OFDI. Moreover, the 
government has effectively been the key operational decision maker in many investment 
projects and, with the creation of a sovereign investment fund in 2007, the China 
Investment Corporation (CIC), very active in overseas M&As, it is increasingly so. CIC 
is accountable for tunnelling foreign currency reserves into foreign equities, industrial 
OFDI, investment banks and hedge funds. 
Chinese SOEs are large domestic players in major industries and backed up by the 
state as officially-recognised monopolies. They are suspected by foreign competitors to 
behave as monopolies outside China as well. Another fear deriving from Chinese OFDI 
by SOEs in some host countries is that it may act as a Chinese state soft power and 
influence abroad, promoting the interests of Chinese government and Communist 
Party. It is so because Chinese state-owned MNCs receive high level of state support in 
the form of credit lines and low interest rate loans from state-owned banks that reduce 
their capital cost and give them a competitive advantage over Western MNCs. Even 
partly privately-owned MNCs such as Haier, Lenovo, Huawei, which promote 
themselves as private companies, keep strong ties with the government. Besides, CEOs 
of the largest 53 Chinese state-owned MNCs are directly appointed by the Communist 
Party and senior managers of most SOEs are appointed by the SASAC; the concern is 
with weak corporate governance and state influence on companies’ management. 
Chinese SOEs not only possess more firm-specific advantages than private 
companies (Liu and Scott-Kennel, 2011) but benefit from competitive advantages built 
up by state OFDI regulation and promotion. However, OFDI determinants are 
different for Chinese state-owned MNCs and privately-owned MNCs (Amighini et al., 
2012). Private MNCs are attracted in large markets and by host country strategic assets; 
they are averse to economic and political risks when choosing their location abroad. 
State-owned MNCs follow China’s strategic needs and thus invest more in natural 
resources abroad, and are widely indifferent to political and economic conditions in host 
countries. They definitely have a dominant strategic role in Chinese OFDI and are very 
sensitive to push factors while privately-owned MNCs react more intensively to pull 
factors. 
A significant difference between Chinese state-owned and Russian MNCs is that 
the former have been ‘corporatized’ but not privatised with a different outcome in 
terms of corporate governance. Listing their stocks in financial markets, at home and 
abroad, Chinese corporatized SOEs were transformed into joint stock companies 
benefiting from larger access to public finance. However their ownership highly 
concentrated in state hands gives their largest or unique shareholder a substantial 
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discretionary power to use the firm’s resources; there from emerges more serious issues 
of insider control and possible minority shareholder despoilment than after Russian 
privatisations (Andreff, 2005). A dominant government ownership and control plants 
the worst seeds for flourishing corruption (Luo and Tung, 2007). Therefore, when 
transforming into MNCs, Chinese SOEs met deep criticisms, at least from Western 
competitors and host countries, about the accountability, transparency, and 
trustworthiness of their corporate governance. 
Ren et al. (2010) contend that in conducting OFDI Chinese firms have three 
strategic motives that are to pursue country-level political objectives, seek for firm-level 
global competence, and escape domestic institutional constraints. The state plays a 
crucial role by designing formal and informal institutional framework to push up OFDI 
business. Formal and informal institutional supports are sources of comparative 
ownership advantages for Chinese firms, i.e. a push factor for OFDI which is 
nevertheless contingent on the firm’s size (small vs. large MNCs) and ownership 
(private companies vs. SOEs). The rise of China on the global political and economic 
scene reflects a significant impact of informal institutions such as national pride and 
state ideology. What is good for Chinese MNCs is good for China (Incorporated). 
7.2 Russian multinationals: instrumental to Russia’s policy 
Before crisis, Russian MNCs were described as a form of soft power which had 
replaced military power of the Russian regime, in particular throughout the close abroad 
(Vahtra, 2005). Under Yeltsin, the government was proactive through privatisation in 
creating big privately-owned companies in monopoly situation22 which swiftly 
transformed into MNCs though it did not really promote OFDI. Under Putin, Russian 
government has shifted its objectives toward promoting OFDI, mostly in the service of 
national strategic goals. Russia conducts a ‘national champions’ policy providing support 
to companies investing abroad in key industries. 
In the 2000s, the government has reinforced its role in the economy through a 
swifter SOEs’ expansion and partial re-nationalisation in some industries. Since 2001, 
state ownership appeared to be on the rise in Russia and this affected Russian MNCs as 
well. Both state participation in the stock equity of some Russian MNCs and their 
internationalisation strategy have increasingly been influenced by Russia’s foreign policy. 
In addition, in 2007 seven big state corporations were launched the CEOs of which 
were appointed directly by the president of the Russian Federation. These corporations 
are in charge of industrial restructuring through gathering activities into big industrial 
trusts under public control in aeronautics, shipyards, the nuclear energy, new 
technologies, and banking. They started up internationalising by acquiring technological 
assets abroad (Vahtra, 2010) while the pressure of presidential administration on to 
them accentuated. Their strategies serve both domestic industrial policy and Russia’s 
foreign policy. In 2008, when Dmitry Medvedev, a former Gazprom CEO, was elected 
President of the Russian Federation, and Igor Sechin, a former Rosneft CEO, was 
appointed Deputy Prime Minister, the relationships between the government and its 
state-owned MNCs tightened a lot. The dividing line between government and business 
                                                 
22 Resulting in a number of oligarchs still being at the head of significant Russian MNCs today 
(Kuznetsov, 2007). 
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became blurred. In a meeting with Russian CEOs from the manufacturing industry in 
2007, Putin enjoined them to proceed more and more with a production diversification, 
export of high tech products and investment abroad. Thus Russian MNCs, whatever 
privately or state-owned, are incited by the state to go on internationalising. 
In industries linked to raw materials and natural resources, the government 
intends to keep an overall direct and indirect control over economic activity, including 
over Russian MNCs. A part of the manufacturing industry is considered by the state as 
strategic (aeronautics, ship building, automotive industry) and is hardly open to free 
competition while the government intervenes on Russian MNCs’ decisions. The part of 
the manufacturing industry which has modernised (ex: telecom, telephone) is more open 
to competition and here MNCs are much less dependent from the state. However, in 
November 2008, Prime Minister Putin asked to CEOs of big Russian enterprises to 
discuss with the state administration of their perspectives and future orientation, 
industry by industry. President Medvedev appealed Russian companies to “copy China” 
by expanding overseas and going on in a global spread of their foreign assets, though 
the government had not yet developed a consistent policy frame for assisting Russian 
MNCs’ global expansion. 
The hydrocarbons industry, and its MNCs, is especially turned into a tool to serve 
Russia’s international relationships, including through controlling the network of oil and 
gas pipes, which is a means for a state control over exports. Indeed, many Russian 
MNCs achieve their OFDI for the sake of national economic interest as it is meant by 
highest governmental authorities. Russian state-owned MNCs are often heavily 
influenced by or incited to stick to major objectives of Russia’s foreign policy. 
Expansionist objectives of state- and privately-owned Russian MNCs are not 
autonomous vis-à-vis the government willingness to be a global player in the world 
economy. Russian political influence is a push factor of Russian investment expansion 
for instance in Central Asia; Russian government tries to help Russian MNCs in Asia 
and Africa as well. 
7.3 Indian government policies geared toward outward foreign direct 
investment 
India being a current account deficit economy, there was a need to closely 
monitor the country’s capital outflows in the past. Like most oil importing less 
developed countries India was a capital scarce economy. Besides, it introduced a 
planning system to force rapid economic development in the 1950s. Consequently, 
foreign (hard) currencies were in shortage and any OFDI by Indian firms was therefore 
subject to state permission (Agarwal, 1985). Before 1969 such permission was given 
only in exceptional cases. In the 1980s, Indian government granted incentives to OFDI 
through financial assistance, concessional loans from the Industrial Development Bank 
of India, and tax exemptions. 
Since 1991, alongside with economic liberalisation, the policy geared toward 
inward FDI and governing OFDI has been liberalised. Liberalisation proceeded with 
national treatment to foreign firms, opening up of many sectors hitherto closed to FDI, 
and instituting an automatic approval route. A number of Indian firms like Tata 
(Goldstein, 2008) had to face global competition since the opening-up of Indian 
economy in 1991, making it imperative to become competitive in the face of new 
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entrants, first in India, then through investing abroad. Indian companies adapted to 
foreign investors’ entrance through linkages, alliances and JVs, leveraging resources on 
them, imitating and learning from them23, and eventually investing abroad like them. 
Indian MNCs are often mentioned as fitting well with the LLL approach. 
The Guidelines for Indian Joint Ventures and Wholly Owned Subsidiaries was 
emended in 1992, 1999 and 2002, and provided for automatic approval of OFDI 
proposals up to $2 million in 1992, $15 million in 1995 and $100 million in 2002 (and 
up to $150 million for OFDI in South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation 
countries - excluding Pakistan - and Myanmar). In 2004 the limit was removed and 
Indian MNCs are now permitted to invest abroad up to 100% of their net worth on an 
automatic basis. In the past recent years, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) raised the 
overseas investment limit from 100% then 300% to 400% of the net worth under the 
automatic route. Indian MNCs were allowed to invest in energy and natural resources 
sectors in excess of the current limits with the prior approval of the RBI. A three year 
profitability requirement was removed for Indian companies making OFDI under the 
automatic route. Furthermore, Indian MNCs can now invest or buy assets abroad in 
areas unrelated to their business at home. 
In the second half of the 2000s, the overall foreign exchange reserve position 
provided comfort to progressive relaxation of capital controls and simplification of 
procedures for OFDI from India. OFDI in banking sector and real estate activities must 
still be considered by an inter-Ministerial group. In 2005, access of Indian MNCs to 
international capital markets was liberalised, allowing them to float international special 
purpose vehicles to finance their overseas M&As. Earlier, Indian firms had to 
compensate for foreign exchange outflows with matching export earnings. Now they are 
allowed to use domestic bank borrowing and to borrow abroad to finance OFDI. In 
2006, the prudential limit on bank financing was raised from 10% to 20% of overseas 
investment. Banks in India were allowed in 2007 to extend funded and/or non-funded 
credit facilities to wholly owned step-down subsidiaries of subsidiaries of Indian 
companies (where the Indian company holds 51% or more) abroad. 
In 2011, the Reserve Bank allowed Indian parties to disinvest their stake abroad 
without prior approval where the amount repatriated on disinvestment is less than the 
amount of original investment. The Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion has 
identified South East Asia, Eastern Europe and Africa as zones where Indian MNCs 
would be encouraged to acquire assets as well as buy-out companies. The government 
approved a policy to support raw material asset purchases made by select public sector 
undertakings abroad. However beyond this liberalisation, from time to time the RBI 
cuts the maximum OFDI allowed to companies and individuals in order to bolster the 
rupee as, for example, in August 2013. 
Indian OFDI has been primarily led by private enterprises except a few state-
owned firms operating in the energy sector (Pradhan, 2010). As against the Chinese 
experience of OFDI’s soft power abroad, India’s OFDI has been largely driven by 
private initiative, with little coordination by the government, except in the energy sector. 
Indeed, India’s first wave of liberalisation, geared toward assisting partners from the 
                                                 
23 Singal and Jain (2012) stress that Indian firms built up strategic capacity to invest abroad through 
strategic alliances, JVs and technology acquisition. 
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South, and enhancing South-South cooperation and the Non-Aligned movement, was 
more obviously aimed at using its soft power in the conventional sense. In contrast, 
OFDI in the post-liberalisation period is targeted at buying existing firms in developed 
countries for competitiveness considerations. 
7.4 Brazilian economic policies that affect outward foreign direct 
investment 
Brazilian government does not strongly interfere in internationalisation of 
Brazilian firms; it has not designed a policy heavily targeting OFDI. However, some 
economic policies aim at helping the development of Brazilian MNCS like a privileged 
credit policy launched in 2002 and the creation of a sovereign fund while other policies 
do affect it indirectly such as the (former) privatisation process, trade liberalisation, a 
competitiveness policy geared towards Brazilian firms, and the exchange rate policy. 
Special lines of credit are offered by the Brazilian National Development Bank – 
BNDES – to Brazilian companies that invest abroad. The BNDES created a specific 
credit line to support their outward expansion in 2002. Since then the Bank operates a 
credit line called “Investimento Direto Externo” to stimulate direct investment abroad, 
offering interest rates lower than market’s and covering the construction of new 
installations abroad, acquisition of equipment, M&As, turnover capital, and export 
support (Campanario et al., 2011). In 2009, as a counter-cyclical policy intervention, the 
BNDES lent $8 billion to foster the expansion of Brazilian MNCs in agribusiness, 
capital goods, construction, engineering, consumer electronics, energy, technical 
services, and IT. However Brazilian MNCs’ access to domestic finance is still limited 
and most have to use their own capital or rely on foreign funding. 
Another policy initiative was the creation in December 2008 of a Brazilian 
sovereign wealth fund (Fundo Soberano do Brazil, FSB), a state-owned investment fund, to 
maximise long-term returns by investing some of Brazil’s foreign exchange reserves. 
This fund has a higher risk tolerance than official funds managed by monetary 
authorities, such as the BNDES and the Central Bank. The FSB objective is to support 
strategic Brazilian overseas M&As and greenfield projects in response to new 
investment opportunities abroad. 
The process of companies’ internationalisation in Brazil followed the exhaustion 
of the import-substitution industrialisation model but without direct industrial policy to 
support new MNCs. Privatisation of industries such as steel, energy, mining, chemical 
products, and telecom in Brazil all over the 1990s have stimulated Brazilian OFDI. 
Privatisation in Brazil in the 1990s promoted the creation of national champions that 
later became large MNCs. The intent was to create large, specialised, restructured and 
publicly-listed firms such as Vale, Embraer and Petrobras; but the government still 
holds controlling shares in Petrobras, and golden shares in Vale and Embraer for 
strategic purpose and to prevent takeovers. 
In the 1990s, together with a reversal of the former import substitution strategy, 
the Collor administration promoted a wide trade liberalisation effort. The result was one 
of promoting internal competition. The Mercosur devices implemented in 1994 have 
contributed to increased access into Brazilian market in that period. This indirectly 
encouraged FDI both ways, inward and outward. A competitiveness policy consisted in 
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incentives for mergers to domestic firms offered by the BNDES which indirectly helped 
to promote Brazilian firms’ internationalisation by facilitating the creation of large 
MNCs, most notably in the past ten years. In absence of a clear investment policy and 
tax incentives to promote OFDI, Campanario et al. (2011) contend that public policies 
may contribute to better competitiveness and innovation of Brazilian enterprises and 
strengthen their capital outflows. The competitiveness of Brazilian MNCs may also 
improve with better regulating exchange rate fluctuations, attracting foreign savings and 
making the best of Brazilian foreign trade. Policy-making takes place in an institutional 
environment in which there are no generally accepted norms or rules to construct policy 
measures and instruments to deal with inward or outward FDI. 
The appreciation of real due to an exchange rate anchor between 1995 and 1998 
was relevant not only to curb inflation, but also trigger a fierce competitive pressure 
over domestic producers. After the administered regime was relaxed in 1999, the 
currency floated and weakened. However the quite favourable international 
environment helped both inward and outward capital flows in the following years until 
the exchange rate plummeted with the 2008 crisis. Although the impact of exchange rate 
policy on OFDI must not be overemphasised since it has been tested as non-significant 
by Concer et al. (2010). 
8. Similarities and differences: a concluding snapshot 
An overall comparative view of OFDI features by BRICs’ MNCs shows up in 
Table 14. First, there are four basic characteristics: a/ OFDI by BRICs’ MNCs primarily 
followed a market seeking strategy; b/ it initially privileged neighbouring markets; c/ it 
resorted to trans-border M&As rather than greenfield investment; d/ in particular when 
OFDI was geared toward developed countries’ markets. To a lesser extent three other 
features are common to all BRICs’ MNCs: e/ all BRICs have home-based MNCs 
investing abroad in a resource seeking perspective in the primary sector; f/ the share of 
the tertiary sector is significant in overall OFDI; while g/ the expansion of BRICs’ 
MNCs has been eased in the past decade by the home country foreign reserve 
accumulation. 
Some traits oppose Brazilian and Indian MNCs to the legacy inherited from the 
past by post-communist Russian and Chinese MNCs. Round tripping and capital flight 
is less significant from Brazil-India than from Russia-China. Brazilian and Indian MNCs 
have benefitted from linkage, leverage and learning when competing with foreign 
inward investors into their home market whereas this approach was slightly less obvious 
with Chinese MNCs and not at all with Russian MNCs. The proportion of SOEs is 
lower among Brazilian-Indian MNCs as compared with the Russian-Chinese ones, thus 
fewer MNC managers are appointed by the state in the former than the latter. State 
support to OFDI promotion in Brazil-India cannot compare with Russia-China where 
OFDI is used as a tool for foreign policy and diplomacy. Though not absent in Brazil-
India, state interference over OFDI is less invasive than in Russia-China, and less fueled 
by national pride and state ideology. 
In all other dimensions listed in Table 14, MNCs from each BRIC are rather 
specific. In a face-to-face comparison between Brazilian and Indian MNCs, efficiency 
seeking is a secondary target of some Indian MNCs whereas it is hardly detected in 
Brazilian MNCs. The latter do not really pursue technological asset seeking while the 
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former are involved in such strategy, though less than Russian-Chinese MNCs, because 
Indian MNCs already are on the technological frontier in some industries like 
pharmaceuticals and IT services. For quite clear geographical reasons, Brazilian OFDI is 
geared toward Latin America contrary to Indian OFDI which is oriented to Asia and 
Africa in a more general context where Indian MNCs (just like Chinese MNCs) are 
investing in other BRICs. Brazil has not a remarkable share of its OFDI settled in other 
BRICs, just like Russia. The privatisation drive was an impulse to internationalisation of 
some Brazilian companies while liberalisation and deregulation in home economy have 
boosted OFDI by already internationalised Indian firms though triggering their 
geographical diversification toward developed countries. Indian MNCs are more 
threatened by foreign competitors in domestic market which contrasts with some local 
monopoly positions of Brazilian MNCs; this leads to more transparent corporate 
governance in the former though resorting to informal practices and corruption may not 
be much different in both. Two last striking contrasts are the significant share of the 
manufacturing industry in overall OFDI from India (much lower a share in Brazil) and a 
past temporary OFDI push factor of Brazilian real exchange rate appreciation. 
The boom of Russian-based just like Chinese-based MNCs was really impressive 
in the past decade. It had taken place in a kind of oligarchic capitalism. A strategic 
coordination between big Russian-Chinese MNCs and Russia’s-China’s economic and 
foreign policies had been strengthened by the governments’ decisions to counteract the 
effects of global crisis. The foundations of a state capitalism intending to weigh on the 
global scene are more and more deeply rooted in both countries. Nowadays, state 
capitalisms accept the globalisation game and play on all cords of state influence and 
intervention in view of providing “institutionally embedded” competitive advantages to 
their state-owned MNCs. It is a success story so far: Gazprom, Lukoil, CNOOC, 
Sinochem, Norilsk Nickel, Vimpelcom, Huawei, Geely and so on actually are flourishing 
companies today and account for as standing among the global leaders in their 
respective industries. 
Beyond these strong similarities, one witnesses some visible differences between 
Chinese and Russian MNCs. The privileged market-seeking strategy is more successful 
with China’s MNCs than Russia’s MNCs. In particular, a market asymmetry is noticed 
between Chinese MNCs significantly investing in Russia and its close abroad while 
Russian MNCs are shy investors in China and its neighbourhood. Some signs of a new 
efficiency-seeking strategy can be checked with Chinese MNCs whereas such strategy is 
absent from Russian MNCs. Chinese MNCs develop an asset-seeking strategy geared 
toward acquiring commercially viable technology rather than core research content 
while Russian MNCs’ asset-seeking focuses on Western technology and R&D intensive 
units. Round tripping OFDI is even more important from China than Russia whereas it 
is the other way round as regard capital flight. The geographical distribution of Chinese 
OFDI is more diversified than the Russian one, namely in Latin America and Africa - 
where first Russian OFDI have emerged only recently. The industrial structure of 
Chinese OFDI exhibits a higher share of services than in Russian OFDI. The 
proportion of privatised and privately-owned firms among MNCs is much higher in 
Russia than China. Chinese MNCs may well be bold enough to invest in more 
institutionally risky host countries with markedly weak governance and corruption, 
much more than Russian MNCs. Finally OFDI promotion is more institutionalised and 
structured in China than in Russia. Most of these differences explain why Chinese 
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MNCs were only slightly, if at all, affected by the crisis from 2009 on, contrarily to 
Russian MNCs. 
 
Table 14 - Similarities and differences between Brazilian, Indian, Russian and Chinese multinationals 
OFDI features and strategies of MNCS from: Brazil India Russia China 
Market-seeking strategy ++ ++ ++ ++ 
Resource-seeking strategy ++ + ++ ++ 
Efficiency-seeking strategy -- - -- -- 
Asset-seeking strategy - + ++ ++ 
Transborder mergers & acquisitions ++ ++ ++ ++ 
Round tripping OFDI - - + ++ 
Capital flight OFDI -- -- + -- 
Preliminary LLL role of inward FDI ++ ++ -- + 
Initially neighbour markets for OFDI ++ ++ ++ ++ 
OFDI in developed countries' markets ++ ++ + + 
OFDI in Latin America ++ - -- + 
OFDI in Africa + ++ - ++ 
FDI in other BRICs -- + -- ++ 
Proportion of SOEs among big MNCs - - + ++ 
MNCs originating in the privatisation drive + - ++ -- 
Monopoly/dominant oligopoly in home market + - ++ ++ 
State appointment of SOEs/MNCs managers - - + ++ 
MNC corporate governance transparency - + -- -- 
State (government) support to OFDI -- - + ++ 
Institutional (state) OFDI promotion -- - + ++ 
State interference/control in OFDI - - ++ ++ 
Informal institutions, corruption, networks + - ++ ++ 
National pride and state ideology - - + ++ 
OFDI in the primary sector (oil, mining, etc.) + + ++ + 
OFDI in the manufacturing industry - + ++ + 
OFDI in the tertiary sector ++ ++ + ++ 
State foreign reserve accumulation + + + ++ 
Exchange rate appreciation + - 0 + 
(++) + = (very) strong or significant 
0 = absent 
-- = weak or of secondary importance 
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Transition, emerging and developing economies 
Andreff, 2003 OFDI/capita i = a + b GDP/capita i + c SECT i + d TECH i + e Gi + f DR i + ui 
 Brazil 




Amal & Tomio, 
2012 
OFDI = f (GDPi, GDPi/POPi, INFi, RERi, TRDi, CDi, GDi, CCi, GEi, PSi, RLi, RQi, 
VAi)  
  Russia 
Kalotay & 
Sulstarova, 2010 
FDIMArh = a + b.GDPh + c.GDPr + d.NRh + e.SERh + f.DISTrh + g.τrh + 
+ i.CIS + j.PATh + uh 
  India 
Anwar, Hasse 
and Rabbi, 2008 
LogYi = β0 + β1 X1 + β2 X2 +β3 X3 +β4 X4 +β5 X5 + β6 X6 + µ  
Hattari & Rajan, 
2010  
Ln (FDIijt) = β0 + β1 ln (GDPit) + β2 ln (GDPjt) + β3 LANGijt + β4 COLONYijt + 





FDIit = α + β Xit + γ Xi + δt + θ i + εit 





OFDI = a.GDPh + b.OILh + c. PATENTh + d.TD94 + e.BITh + f.ACBIT + 
+ g.DTTh + i.ACDTT + j.WTOh + k.CPh + l.DISh + m.RISKh + n.PPPh + 
+ o.ERATEh + p.INFh + q.EXPh + r.IMPh + s INFDIh 
 
OFDI/capitai : outward foreign direct investment stock per inhabitant in the home country (i = home 
country) 
GDP/capitai : gross domestic product per inhabitant in the home country 
SECTi : GDP distribution across groups of industries in the home country 
TECHi : technological level in the home country 
Gi : GDP rate of growth in the home country 
DRi : exchange rate variation of the home county’s currency 
NOIpc : net outward foreign investment (outward direct minus inward direct investment) per capita 
GNIpcap : gross national income per capita 
OFDI: outward foreign direct investment 
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GDPi : gross domestic country of a host country i 
GDPi/POPi : GDP per inhabitant in country i 
INFi inflation rate in country i 
RERi : real exchange rate between country i’s currency and the real 
TRDi : trade flows (import, export) between Brazil and country i 
CDi : cultural distance between Brazil and country i 
GDi : geographical distance between Brazil and country i 
CCi : control of corruption in country i 
GEi : government effectiveness in country i 
PSi : political stability and absence of violence / terrorism in country i 
RLi : rule of law (law enforcement) in country i 
RQi : quality of regulation in country i 
VAi : voice and accountability in country i 
FDIMArh : OFDI from Russia to a host country h 
GDPh and GDPr : Russia’s and host country’s gross domestic product, as proxies for their respective 
market sizes 
NRh: share of natural resources and raw materials in overall Russian exports to each host country h, 
proxy for comparative endowment in natural resources 
SERh : share of services in the host country’s GDP 
DISTrh: the geographical distance between Russia and each host country, classical gravity variable 
τrh : ruble exchange rate against a host country’s currency 
CIS : dummy variable standing for CIS membership, proxy for cultural proximity between Russia and 
some host countries 
PATh : the number of patents registered in a host country showing whether a country h is a favourable 
location for Russian MNCs where to acquire technological assets. 
LogYi : logarithm of OFDI volume in year i 
X1 : host country’s real GDP in $ billion 
X2 : real GDP per capita 
X3 : host country’s real GDP rate of growth 
X4 : real exchange rate of the host country’s currency into US dollar 
X5 : geographical distance between New Dehli and the host country’s capital (gravity variable) 
X6 : real GDP deflator in host country (% change) 
Ln (FDIijt) : logarithm of foreign direct investment outflow from country i to country j at time t 
GDPit and GDPjt : respectively home and host country’s real GDP in US dollar at time t 
LANGij : binary variable equal to one if the two economies share a common official language 
COLONYij : binary variable equal to one if the two economies have a past colonial relationship 
DISTij : geographical distance between one home and one host country 
Xijt : vector of other explanatory variables influencing FDI outflows: bilateral real exchange rate of a 
home country’s with host country’s currency; R&D expenditure as a percentage of host country’s 
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GDP, energy production in host country, a ratio of market capitalisation to host country’sGDP, 
and a ratio of total trade to GDP in host country 
ηi : unobservable type of home country effects 
λt : unobservable time effects (year dummies) 
FDIit : outward foreign direct investment from country i at time t 
Xit : a vector that comprises variables varying by host country and over time: GDP, GDP per capita, 
GDP growth, inflation, trade openness, the ratio between current FDI stock and GDP, the 
Heritage index, the existence of a bilateral investment (or tax) treaty, and in some specifications 
the natural resource endowment and patents relative to population 
Xi : a vector that comprises time-invariant host country characteristics: distance, the size of Indian 
diaspora in country i, and whether there is a common language 
δt : year dummies 
θi : host country dummies 
GDPh : GDP per capita in host country h (captures market-seeking motives) 
OILh : oil and gas exports of h to China (captures resource-seeking motives) 
PATENTh : total annual patent grants in h (captures a technological asset-seeking strategy) 
TD94 : the liberalisation of foreign exchange control in China in 1994 
BITh : number of bilateral investment treaties concluded by a country with China 
ACBIT : total number of BITs a country has concluded 
DTTh : number of non-double taxation treaties concluded by a country with China 
ACDTT : total number of DTTs a country has concluded 
WTOh : membership of a country h in the World Trade Organisation 
CPh : cultural proximity of country h to China 
DISh : geographical distance of a country h from China 
RISKh : political risk in country h 
PPPh : purchasing power parity (to check the difference in inflation rates between a country h and China) 
ERATEh : exchange rate of the h country’s currency against the renminbi 
INFh : inflation in country h 
EXPh : exports from country h to China 
IMPh : country h imports from China 
INFDIh : index of market openness to FDI in country h, i.e. the ratio of inward FDI to GDP. 
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